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"NO FETISH" FOR PRIVACY, FAIRNESS, OR
JUSTICE: WHY WILLIAM REHNQUIST, NOT KEN
STARR, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR WILLIAM
JEFFERSON CLINTON'S IMPEACHMENT
Alfredo Garciat
INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom would have us believe that the United States
Supreme Court and its Chief Justice, William Rehnquist, played, at best,
a tangential role in William Jefferson Clinton's impeachment.' Historians ought to assess that judgment with a critical eye. The traditional
view, as reflected in media accounts, depicts a zealous prosecutor bent
on uncovering the President's wrongdoing, regardless of the cost. Kenneth Starr's fervor in pursuing the President, the orthodox perspective
explains, was facilitated by the Court's decisions in Morrison v. Olson2
and Clinton v. Jones.3 In those opinions, the Court rejected the constitutional challenge to the Independent Counsel statute and held that the
President could be compelled to defend against a civil suit during his
term of office. Accordingly, the traditional view goes, William Rehnquist performed the largely ceremonial role assigned to the Chief Justice
as the presiding officer in the trial conducted by the Senate on the Articles of Impeachment.
Beyond simply presiding over the trial, however, William Rehnquist
provided the vital legal tools Ken Starr and his subordinates successfully
employed to secure the President's impeachment. Indeed, the Supreme
Court paved the way for Starr's relentless and far-ranging investigation
of the President's private life, culminating in the salacious and detailed
report on the intimate details of the sexual behavior between the President and Monica Lewinsky. The Rehnquist Court also enabled the Independent Counsel to subject Lewinsky, without the benefit of legal
counsel, to intense pressure in the hopes of turning her into a witness
against the President. The manner in which witnesses were handled at
t Professor, St. Thomas University, School of Law. I would like to thank Pascale

Chancy, class of 2001 for her invaluable research assistance. I received helpful comments
from Paul Marcus and George Thomas on earlier versions of this manuscript.
1 See, e.g., EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RiSE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF

THE MODERN SUPREME COURT V (Penguin Books ed., 1999) (arguing that the Court played a
"minor role" and Chief Justice Rehnquist was a mere "figurehead" in President Clinton's trial).
2 487 U.S. 654 (1988).

3 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
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the grand jury stage of the investigation reflected decisions by the Court
that eroded any protections still afforded by that putatively "independent" body.
Rather than focusing on Starr and his tactics, historians should instead emphasize the manner in which the Rehnquist Court systematically
eliminated privacy from the lexicon of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Further, historians should look with suspicion on a Court that has
transformed the right to counsel into a privilege rather than a hallowed
right. Breaks in the secrecy that enshrouds the grand jury should not
surprise historians in light of the Court's opinions that allow prosecutors
to violate grand jury rules with impunity. By failing to sanction the government when it withholds exculpatory evidence from the grand jury, the
Rehnquist Court has fostered a milieu in which the Independent Counsel
could in effect view the grand jury as his own fiefdom.
Not only did Rehnquist pave the way for the President's impeachment, he also underscored the Supreme Court's distance from the public's perception of fairness in the adversarial criminal justice system.
Implicit in the public's rejection of Starr's unrelenting investigation of
the President is the repudiation of the tactics he employed to achieve
those ends. Uncomfortable with the toll on human emotions, privacy,
and dignity exacted by Starr's investigative strategies, the public excoriated the President's behavior while simultaneously rejecting the notion
that his conduct should result in removal from office. 4 As members of a
cultural and socioeconomic elite 5 whose outlook is divorced from the
"real world ' 6 of criminal law, both Rehnquist and Starr (a former jurist)
could not discern the pragmatic implications of their opinions or investigative tactics.
Furthermore, the historical ramifications of President Clinton's impeachment and acquittal betray an irony beyond its immediate results.
The unparalleled and runaway prosecution of the President presages the
dawn of a police state in which law enforcement agencies as well as
prosecutors perceive few if any constraints upon their ability to trample
upon the privacy, dignity, and property rights of ordinary citizens. Para4 See, e.g., Dan Balz & Claudia Deane, Poll: Most Oppose Continuing Trial, WASH.
Jan. 31, 1999, at A21 (revealing that only 33 % of those polled supported President
Clinton's conviction and removal from office as opposed to 64% who believed the President's
conduct did not warrant removal from office).
5 See Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?,93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 145, 189-91 (1998) (discussing the "culturally elite biases" of judicial review).
6 In Lee v. Illinois, Justice Blackmun chided his colleagues for emphasizing the theoretical aspects of criminal procedure and neglecting "the significant realities that so often characterize a criminal case." 476 U.S. 530, 547-48 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun succinctly observed, "[t]here is a real world as well as a theoretical one." Id. at 548.
POST,

See generally ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE:
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doxically, both the public and the President have failed to grasp the link
between their zeal for enhancing the power of law enforcement and the
7
inevitable loss of autonomy and freedom that that perspective entails.
Freedom is "a protean concept" that is subject to change depending on
the tenor of the times. 8 A Court whose goal is to eradicate the perceived
crisis engendered by crime may only accomplish that goal at a priceliberty, dignity, and property rights must take a back seat to a purportedly omniscient and powerful government untrammeled by any significant checks and balances.
In this article, I interweave the Rehnquist Court's "criminal justice"
jurisprudence with the Clinton impeachment trial to demonstrate the
nexus between the excesses committed by the Office of the Independent
Counsel and the doctrinal basis for that governmental action. First, I
compare the extent to which the Court has undermined privacy rights
through the pervasive intrusion of the Independent Counsel into the private lives of Lewinsky and Clinton. Next, I critique the way Lewinsky
was drawn into the controversy by the Office of the Independent Counsel
without the benefit of the advice of counsel. In doing so, I focus on the
Rehnquist Court's devaluation of the right to counsel as the hallmark of
our criminal justice system. Finally, I examine the grand jury's role in
the impeachment process and juxtapose that story with the manner in
which the Rehnquist Court has converted the institution into the prosecutor's unfettered domain.
Before engaging in this exercise, let me issue an important caveat.
This Article does not address the morality of the President's behavior.
Simply put, the President's conduct was reprehensible. As Michael J.
Klarman notes, "[i]t is an equally accurate description of the President's
conduct to say that he behaved immorally, that he lied, that he lied under
oath, that he lied under oath about a sexual affair, that he lied under oath
about a sexual affair that was not material to the proceedings in which
the question was asked, and so on." 9
My aim is to place the "affair," and the constitutional crisis it engendered, in a broader perspective. In short, the Starr investigation illustrated the Rehnquist Court's extreme deference to law enforcement
objectives, to the detriment of the liberty interests of American citizens
and the legitimacy of its own jurisprudence.
7
SEXUAL

With respect to this myopia on President Clinton's part, see
MCCARTHYISM:

CLINTON,

STARR,

AND
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M.

DERSHOWITZ,

EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

150-53 (1998).
xiv-xviii (1998).
9 Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate,
85 VA. L. REv. 631, 644 (1999).
8 ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM
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PRIVACY AND FREEDOM-WHAT'S LEFT?

"If the personal life of the most powerful man in the nation can be
violated so wantonly by a Government-appointed prosecutor, then we are
all at risk ....

[I]f liberty means the right to privacy and to do as we

wish as long as we do not violate the rights and privacy of others, then
we no longer live in a free state."' 1
The Clinton impeachment saga demonstrated how defenseless a
powerful leader can feel when the most intimate aspects of his private
life are meticulously revealed not only to the nation but to the world at
large. We may viscerally attribute this phenomenon to the President's
unwillingness or inability to tell the truth. Similarly, we may explain it
by stressing Starr's obsession with the task with which he was entrusted:
"investigating and perhaps prosecuting a particular individual," II that is,
the President of the United States. From an institutional perspective, we
may focus on the inherent flaws attending the independent counsel statute. 12 After all, that statute invites abuse to the extent it involves "picking the man and then searching the law books, or putting investigators to
work, to pin some offense on him."' 13 Finally, we may ascribe the Clinton impeachment to the Rehnquist Court's holding in Clinton v. Jones,
which failed to insulate the President from a civil suit during his term of
office. 14
Conspicuously missing from such analyses is the role the Supreme
Court has played in narrowing the definition of privacy. It is noteworthy
that Judge Richard Posner, who is not one to "fetishize privacy," condemns the "Starr report's unnecessary invasions of the President's privacy."' 15 What Posner fails to point out is the evident nexus between
divulging unnecessary facts and the erosion of privacy engendered by the
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of what constitutes a "reasonable
expectation of privacy"' 6 in modem American society. Instead, Posner

10 Orlando Patterson, What Is Freedom Without Privacy?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1998, at
A27.
I I Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 730 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12 See generally Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-598 (1994 &
Supp. 2001).
13 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Jackson, J.).
14 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
15 RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT AND

TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 80-83 (1999) (criticizing the report's revelations of lurid aspects of the sexual encounters between the President and Lewinsky) (emphasis in original).
16 This is the modern standard for determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation
has occurred. It was set forth in Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
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merely recites the judicial fiction that such "prosecutorial misconduct" is
17
irrelevant in both criminal and civil law.
One must ponder a relevant question in determining whether Ken
Starr exceeded the bounds of prosecutorial decency in exposing the Clinton-Lewinsky affair: could Starr have uncovered evidence of the relationship without having Linda Tripp's tapes to corroborate the affair?
By shifting the time, the circumstances, and the focus of the affair, the
answer is surprising. In fact, the Rehnquist Court's definition of privacy
may have made it possible to uncover the affair without resorting to use
of the Tripp tapes. Let us examine that distinct possibility.
A.

LOOKING THROUGH THE WHITE HOUSE BLINDS: ONE WAY TO
"GET" BILL CLINTON WITHOUT THE TRIPP TAPES

Imagine the following scenario: A security officer who patrols the
grounds of the White House inadvertently peers through open blinds into
the Oval Office and gets a glimpse of the President and Lewinsky engaged in sexual relations. 18 He reports the observation to his superiors,
who in turn contact the Office of the Independent Counsel and provide
Starr with the information. Starr's office debriefs the officer about the
incident and instructs him to obtain more information and details by deliberately looking through the opening in the blinds. Further, Starr provides the officer with a camera to record the activity. The officer peers
through the blinds one more time, observes the activity, and records it.
Subsequently, the officer turns the film over to the Independent Counsel.
Starr approaches Lewinsky and shows her the film. She is shocked
and incensed by the flagrant violation of her, as well as the President's,
right to privacy. What really disturbs her is Starr's suggestion that if she
does not become a witness against the President, she will be charged
with a violation of the District of Columbia statute that prohibits adultery.' 9 Although this crime is merely a misdemeanor, the embarrassing
and shocking nature of having the intimate encounter revealed to the
world makes Lewinsky seriously ponder Starr's offer.
At first glance, it might appear that the President has an expectation
of privacy in his "office" and that Lewinsky should be accorded the same
right. The officer's actions seem to constitute a clear violation of both
parties' expectations of privacy, as defined in the seminal case of Katz v.
17 POSNER, supra note 15, at 83. Posner notes that "one cannot defend against a criminal
prosecution on the ground that the prosecutor has made public disclosure of more details of
your private life than he had to do in order to carry out his prosecutorial duties." Id.
18 Although the definition of sexual relations was controverted in the Clinton impeachment case, for purposes of this article I would define sexual relations to include oral sex.
19 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-301 (1981).
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United States.20 Upon a more careful analysis, however, the conclusion
that Lewinsky is entitled to privacy seems questionable.
As the Court has acknowledged, "[w]ithin the workplace context
. .. employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against
intrusions by police. '21 A person "has standing to object to a search of
his office, as well as of his home."'22 Presumably, the President would
expect that his privacy in his office would not be invaded at night.
Against this privacy interest, however, the court must weigh the reasonableness of the governmental invasion. In the workplace context, the
Court has held that neither a search warrant nor probable cause is necessary to investigate "work-related" misconduct. Rather, a reasonableness
standard supplants the Fourth Amendment's traditional requirements. 2 3
Reasonableness is in turn linked to "the inception and the scope of the
intrusion."'24 Significantly, however, the standard presupposes that the
search is undertaken by an employer for a noncriminal purpose.2 5 Under
these standards, the President may have a valid argument that the officer
was unjustified in peeking into the Oval Office to begin with.
Who is the President's employer? Of course, it is the American
people. If the American people have a vested interest in preserving the
dignity and decorum associated with the Oval Office, they have a corresponding interest in uncovering behavior that detracts from and undermines those characteristics. The weight of "special needs beyond law
enforcement" has led the Court to suspend probable cause and warrant
requirements and to conclude that the privacy of the employee must
sometimes give way to an effective and efficient workplace. In my hypothetical, then, one could argue that the President's privacy interest is
outweighed by the public's interest in preventing immoral conduct that
undermines the effectiveness of the Presidential office. If the security
officer is a representative of the people, who employ the President, then
he might be considered an employer rather than a law enforcement agent.
Hence, one may plausibly argue that neither the initial action by the officer nor the search conducted at the Independent Counsel's urging violated the Fourth Amendment.
20 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Fourth Amendment provides protection to anyone "exhibit[ing] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy" where that expectation is "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
21 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987), citing Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.

364 (1968).
22 Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369.
23 O'Connor,480 U.S. at 725-26.
24 Id. at 726.

25 See id. at 724 (distinguishing the interests of public employers from those of law
enforcement officials and deeming a probable cause requirement for public employers too
burdensome "when the search is not used to gather evidence of a criminal offense").
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Under the standard set forth in O'Connorv. Ortega,26 the search is
justified at its inception "when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty
of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a
noninvestigatory work-related purpose. ' 27 Perhaps the President could
contend that the officer did not have any reasonable grounds to believe
that he was engaged in work-related misconduct. On the other hand,
given some suspicion that the President might have been violating workplace rules, the officer may have been justified in attempting either to
corroborate or to dispel his suspicions. 28 Such suspicions, moreover,
need not rise to the level of probable cause, which requires a "probability
or substantial chance" 29 of the suspected wrongdoing, but need only
amount to some intermediate level between a mere "hunch" and a "fair
30
probability.
The second prong of the O'Connortest relates to the scope of the
intrusion. From a common-sense perspective, filming the most intimate
encounter between two adults would offend most people's sense of privacy. Nevertheless, the O'Connor plurality, along with Justice Scalia,
who concurred in the result, found that the thorough search of a public
employee's office, desk, cabinets, and the seizure of highly personal
items, such as a Valentine's Day card, a photograph, and a book of poetry, 31 did not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment. 32 Reasoning
by analogy, the filming of the encounter would be an acceptable means
of providing concrete evidence that the President violated work-place
standards by engaging in such activities in his office, however personal
those actions may have been.
Orlando Patterson's telling criticism comes to life in the preceding
scenario. A public employee's place of work is not so private under the
Court's Fourth Amendment analysis. Indeed, the O'Connor v. Ortega
opinion underscores how vulnerable a public employee's private affairs
are in the face of minimal suspicions of workplace violations. Although
26 480 U.S. 709 (1987).

27 Id. at 726.

28 The reasonable suspicion benchmark was established by the Court in Terry v.Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
29 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983).
30 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-31 (1990) (defining the reasonable suspicion standard).
31 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 713.
32 The plurality in O'Connorremanded the case in part because the lower court made no
findings as to the scope of the search. They intimated that the search would have been justified

if there had been a "reasonable belief that there was government property in Dr. Ortega's
office" assuming that the scope of the search was reasonable. Id. at 728. Justice Scalia would
have held that government searches to investigate work-related violations do not violate the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the President's behavior was reprehensible, to the extent that it occurred
in the "office" and not in the "home," it was automatically divorced from
the traditional protections embedded in the text of the Fourth Amendment. 33 One may avoid such searches by simply leaving personal items,
or personal matters, at "home." How practical such a suggestion may be
34
is another matter.
Since the President could allege that the search was either not workrelated or undertaken to uncover evidence of criminal misconduct, he
could circumvent O'Connor's relaxed standards and void the searches
for lack of a warrant. 35 This would be a hollow victory, however, because even if the "search" by the official occurred, for instance, not in
the Oval Office but in the Lincoln bedroom, the evidence would not be
suppressed. The President's expectation of privacy in his house is violated, yet he is unable to protect against the prying eyes of the government because his short-term guest, Lewinsky, may not have standing to
contest the validity of the search. 36 Before we explore this not-so-improbable scenario further, we must analyze the policy implications flowing from the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment's reach.
B.

BEWARE OF WHOM YOU INVITE INTO YOUR HOUSE OR
"INTIMATE" ACTIVITIES MAY BE SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENTAL
SURVEILLANCE!

In Minnesota v. Carter,37 the Supreme Court attempted to determine
the privacy interest that a guest who was not staying overnight 38 should
be accorded in her host's home. Although it did not issue a "bright-line"
39
rule, the majority in Cartergave law enforcement a significant victory,
one that may be as significant and far-reaching as the Court's decision in
Rakas v. Illinois.4 0 What Carter portends is ominous: the ability of the
33 But see id. at 739 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was prescient in recognizing the reality that work and home have become indistinguishable for many working

Americans. Id.
34 See id.
35 See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 ("The operational realities of the workplace ... may
make some employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official."). Justice Scalia disagreed with the plurality's

premise that the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy differs when the search is by a
supervisor rather than a law-enforcement agent. Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring).
36 See discussion infra, Part I.B.
37 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
38 In Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), the Court held that an overnight guest has
an expectation of privacy in his host's premises.
39 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. at 91 (holding that "respondents had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the apartment .... ").
40 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In Rakas, a slim majority of the Court revolutionized the law of standing by holding that in order to claim standing to contest the validity of
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government to strip a resident of her privacy by virtue of whom she invites into her abode. As Justice Ginsburg aptly noted in dissent, Carter
"undermines . . .the security of the home resident herself."'4 ' The dissent's response to the majority's holding, however, did not adequately
deal with the potential ramifications of the decision.
In Carter, a police officer, after receiving a tip from an informant,
looked through a gap in the closed blind of an apartment window and
observed three people, including the lessee, "bagging" cocaine. 42 The
officer peered through the gap in the blind for "several minutes. '43 At
the time he looked through the drawn blinds, the officer was unaware of
the status of the occupants. As the majority acknowledged, "[t]he police
later learned that while Thompson was the lessee of the apartment,
Carter and Johns lived in Chicago and had come to the apartment for the
sole purpose of packaging the cocaine."'44 Ultimately, the officer used
the observations to obtain a search warrant for the apartment, but both
Carter and Johns were arrested after they left the premises by car and
before the warrant was issued. 45 The police discovered a handgun in the
46
car; a later search of the car revealed, among other things, cocaine.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, focused on three factors that deprived both Carter and Johns of an expectation of privacy in
the lessee's apartment: (1) the "commercial nature of the transaction,"
(2) the brief period of time (two and a half hours) Carter and Johns spent
in the apartment, and (3) their lack of a previous connection to the premises. 47 These factors left the petitioners with no standing to contest the
validity of the peering officer's observations. 4 8 In a concurring opinion
in which he derided Katz v. United States and other case law for delineating a "fuzzy" standard for gauging Fourth Amendment safeguards, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, resorted to the text of the
amendment, its history, and the common law to arrive at the same result
as the majority. 49 Because he concluded that the Amendment did not
extend protection to people in other people's homes, 50 Scalia left the
a search, the claimant must demonstrate a personal and reasonable expectation of privacy in
the place searched. Id. at 143-44. Thus, standing no longer was a discrete issue, but rather,
inextricably entwined with the Katz analysis.
41 Carter,525 U.S. at 106 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 85.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
45 Id. at 85.
46

47
48

Id.
Id. at 86, 91.

Id.

49 Id. at 91-96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50 Id. at 92.
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question of further expansion of the Constitution's reach to the
legislatures. 5'

Faithful to the rationale underlying Rakas, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion rejected the petitioner's standing claim, although not
without a strong caveat. Justice Kennedy concluded that "as a general
rule, social guests will have an expectation of privacy in their host's
home."'52 Nevertheless, Carter and Johns's brief connection to the
Thompson home nullified any expectation of privacy therein. 3 Justice
Kennedy's fidelity to Rakas underscores the rational extension of the
doctrine from the automobile to the home. We will return to this theme
later.
Finally, Justice Breyer agreed with the dissent's notion that respondents did have standing under the Fourth Amendment. 54 According to
Breyer's analysis, however, the claims raised by Carter and Johns failed
because of their inability to establish that the police conducted an unreasonable search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 55 The police officer
who peered into the apartment was in a public place and could see
through the window into the kitchen.5 6 Additionally, the people in the
apartment failed to take the precautions necessary to prevent the view
into the dwelling.5 7 At a more fundamental level, Breyer applies the
Katz rubric to warn that safety in the home depends upon totally, not
partially, closed blinds. 58 This is especially true for an apartment dweller
59
whose unit faces a publicly traveled street.
Having summarized the rationale behind Carter,let us now apply it
to the Clinton-Lewinsky affair. The first intimate encounter between the
parties occurred in Presidential adviser George Stephanopoulos's office. 60 Lewinsky flirted with the President, and he responded by
promptly inviting her into his private office. 6 1 At that point, they kissed,
62
and a short time later Lewinsky performed oral sex on the President.
Assume that these two encounters were viewed by the officer patrolling
the White House grounds through a small gap in the blinds. What is the
legal outcome of this police conduct under Carter?
51 Id. at 98.

52 Id. at 102 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
53 Id.

54 Id. at
55 Id. at
56 Id. at
57 Id.
58 Id. at

103 (Breyer, J., concurring).
103-06.
104.

105

59 Id.
60 KENNETH STARR, REFERRAL FROM INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, H.R. Doc. No. 105-3 10, at

29 (1998).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 29-30.
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Under the Carter majority's reasoning, Lewinsky simply had no expectation of privacy that would keep her intimate encounter with the
President shielded from public exposure in a court of law. Lewinsky had
been on the premises for a short period of time and had very little meaningful connection with the President before the encounter. Although the
transaction was not purely "commercial," it would fall outside the norm
of a typical "social" guest. Moreover, since the Oval Office was a place
of business, rather than a "home" per se, one could view the activity as
falling within the confines of the workplace. Similarly, under Justice
Kennedy's standard, it is easy to find that Lewinsky had, at most, "a
fleeting and insubstantial connection" with the place, even if it were to
be classified as a "home," where the encounter occurred. Finally, Justice
Breyer would find that, by leaving any part of the premises exposed, the
President and Lewinsky assumed the risk that a passerby would obtain a
glimpse of the interior. Thus, the officer's activity would not constitute a
search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
Even if the President claimed the Fourth Amendment's protection
under my "hypothetical" scenario, it would do him little good. Lewinsky
could be prosecuted for violating the District of Columbia code and she
would not be able to invoke the protections flowing from the Fourth
Amendment because she lacked an "expectation of privacy" in the premises. Accordingly, the President's privacy would still be at risk because
Lewinsky would not be able to contest the validity of the officer's intrusion, and his observations would ultimately be exposed in a courtroom.
What has Carter wrought with its hackneyed and distorted lens of
everyday experience? The most intimate activity occurring within your
home is not protected from public view. Anyone who invites a person to
his or her house risks the privacy that inheres within the four walls of the
structure. This ranges from morally abhorrent but very private behavior
to the most innocent and pleasurable experiences. Let us take two examples to illustrate my point.
Assume the homeowner invites a prostitute into the premises after
contracting for her services. She had not previously been in the house,
the transaction is purely commercial, and there was no previous relationship between the parties. Yet, the householder inadvertently left a gap in
the blind, allowing the police officer to peer through the window and
observe the most intimate of human encounters. Though the householder's behavior is morally reprehensible, he surely should have expected the activity to be private. Of course, both parties are subject to
prosecution for their actions. The householder may be immune from
prosecution, especially if the police officer stepped into the curtilage to
observe the activity. But if he lives in an apartment fronting a public
street, his socioeconomic status may prevent him from claiming the po-
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lice officer searched the premises, especially under Justice Breyer's interpretive lens.
The prostitute, however, is precluded from challenging the police
conduct altogether. She did not have an expectation of privacy in the
house. She was merely a "fleeting" social guest whose entry into a private home for an intimate encounter is not sufficient to accord her an
expectation of privacy. More important, the householder cannot shield
this activity from being exposed in a public courtroom because the prostitute is powerless in this regard. At bottom, this is the fundamental risk
Carter engenders: the exposure of intimate activities inside the home because the homeowner is careless in not hermetically sealing the house
from public view and invites a guest into the dwelling who lacks a sufficient nexus to the premises.
Let us, however, take a more benign situation to explore the potential ramifications of Carter. You are the parent of two young children
and wish to give them an eventful birthday party. You make arrangements with either a business or an individual to entertain them with
magic tricks, clowns, music, etc. You reach an agreement on the fee for
these services with the business or individuals. Unknown to you, one of
these people has a prior criminal record and the police believe, though
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, he might possess a controlled substance. You open the door to these individuals, the party begins, and the children begin to enjoy the festivities. You close the
curtains or blinds to prevent other uninvited children from barging into
the party, but leave a small opening in either the blinds or the curtains.
Acting on their suspicion, police officers have followed these individuals to your home, intrude through the curtilage and into the threshold
of the house, and observe the party furtively through the opening in the
curtains or blinds. What are the police accomplishing by prying into the
confines of your dwelling? Perhaps they may see evidence of drugs protruding from the suspected individual's pocket when he least expects it.
Or the police may employ highly sophisticated equipment designed to xray an individual's clothing without his knowledge. The motivation or
reasons behind the police activity are irrelevant, especially if their investigative tactics yield fruit. The important legal variable is whether the
suspects may claim the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment.
Relying on the three variables set forth by Carter, it is clear that if
the investigation is successful in furnishing probable cause or reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, the entertainers will not have a Fourth
Amendment claim. They were on the premises for a short period of
time, since it is unlikely that the party lasted for more than two and onehalf hours. It is evident that the suspects entered the house for a purely
commercial purpose. Finally, we may safely presume the suspects had
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no previous connection to the dwelling. What did the homeowners risk
by engaging in this "commercial transaction?" They risked the privacy of
their dwelling being exposed to the police and the embarrassment of having to explain to their neighbors the commotion generated by the arrest
of the suspects, whether the arrest occurs inside or outside of the house.
The crucial mistake you committed, besides not closing the blinds
securely, was not undertaking a thorough background check of these individuals before inviting them into your home. What Carterpresages is
the risk that your home will become vulnerable to such unexpected
searches depending on whom you invite into that putative sanctuary.
You assume the risk that the home is no longer safe from the prying eyes
of the police if you fail to delve into the background of your short-term,
commercial guests.
The preceding scenarios do not fall within the ambit of "classroom
hypotheticals [involving] the milkman or pizza deliverer. ' 63 This is ultimately why Justice Ginsburg's dissent leaves, if you will, too many
"gaps." She chose only to "decide the case of the homeowner who
chooses to share the privacy of her home and her company with a guest
....
,64 As I have demonstrated with two concrete examples, there are a
variety of circumstances in which a homeowner may wish to invite
someone into her house for a commercial purpose and not thereby jeopardize her privacy. Indeed, given the prevalence of Americans choosing
to work within the home, the Carter plurality's conclusion that their
three-prong standard satisfies the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test rings hollow.
For example, would the result under that standard be different if,
instead of a "cocaine-bagging" transaction, the parties had entered the
premises so that Ms. Thompson could prepare their income tax returns?
Suppose the Internal Revenue Service was pursuing these individuals for
tax fraud. The suspects contact Ms. Thompson, who is an accountant
working out of her home. She has never met them nor have they previously been in her home. The IRS agents look through the blinds, photograph the process of preparation in the hopes of obtaining evidence of
fraud against the suspects, and are successful in doing so. Let us say the
suspects are in the home for approximately three hours. If Ms. Thompson becomes involved in the fraud, she may have a basis to claim the
benefit of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, but the suspects
would not. Thus, her privacy would be compromised by having invited
the clients in for what may have initially been a prosaic, commercial, and
otherwise innocent arrangement. The Carter opinion presumes that
63 Minnesota v. Carter, 107 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64 Id.
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every American who works out of the home should conduct a background check of every short-term "commercial" guest.
Where Justice Ginsburg's dissent hits home is in her trenchant criticism of the plurality's nebulous criteria. A homeowner must guess
whether a guest's duration of stay, purpose, and "acceptance into the
household" will be sufficient to "earn protection. ' 65 Conversely, a
homeowner must, while conjecturing about her guest's status, determine
whether she should take the leap of inviting her into the dwelling at the
price of risking her own privacy. This, of course, presupposes that
Americans are steeped in the nuances of the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Herein lies the irony behind Carter'sflawed logic: Americans presume their homes are their castles and are protected from government intrusion without the substantive justifications required for a
search warrant or a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. That supposition is no longer justified because Carter"will tempt
police to pry into private dwellings without warrant, to find evidence
66
incriminating guests who do not rest there through the night."
Further, the facts of Cartersuggest that the police might be tempted
to invade private dwellings even without knowing the status of the occupants. As the opinion notes, the police became aware that Thompson
was the lessee only after Officer Thielen had observed the suspects package the cocaine. 67 Ms. Thompson, moreover, suffered the identical fate
as her short-term guests: she was convicted of the same crimes. 6 8 The
moral of the story is that the police have a motivation for "looking
through the blinds," in the hopes of uncovering evidence; they can ask
questions about the occupants' status later. Not only would short-term
guests be powerless to invoke the exclusionary remedy, the homeowner
herself may fail to avail herself of the Fourth Amendment's protection.
Justice Breyer's interpretation may accord with this result.
A counterargument is offered by Justice Scalia's concurring opinion. Carefully parsing the words of the Fourth Amendment and relying
on historical materials, Justice Scalia derides the Katz standard as an unbridled weapon through which a majority of the Court's predilections
about "privacy" may be fulfilled. With sarcasm, he observes that the
privacy expectations that society deems reasonable "bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable. '69 Citing an 1816 case, Oysted v. Shed,70 Justice Scalia notes
65

Id.

66 Id. (citing Eulis Simien, Jr., The Interrelationshipof the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 ARK. L. REV. 487, 539 (1988)).
67 Id. at 86.

68 Id. at 107 n.l(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

69 Id. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring).
70 13 Mass. 520 (1816).
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that he would not allow the dwelling to become a "sanctuary" for a stranger or a visitor, even at the pain of permitting the "officer [to] break open
doors or windows in order to execute his process."' 7 1 Protection from

such a practice, in Scalia's estimation, lies with the legislature, not the
courts, since the Fourth Amendment does not protect privacy, but rather
"persons, houses, papers, and effects."'72
Returning to my hypothetical Clinton-Lewinsky scenario, I surmise
Justice Scalia would have President Clinton petition a hostile, Republican Congress to pass legislation forbidding "peeking" through the open
blinds in order to uncover allegedly criminal transgressions. Ironically,
James Madison ultimately became convinced that a federal bill of rights
was necessary and wise because it would check majoritarian excesses
and guard against arbitrary governmental actions. 73 As Gordon Wood
deftly put it, Madison and Jefferson were acutely aware that "the people
...were as capable of despotism as any prince; public liberty was no
guarantee after all of private liberty." 74 To Justice Scalia, privacy is not
mentioned in the Fourth Amendment, and the security enumerated in the
Amendment only extends to one's home and might quickly evaporate
when a short-term guest not staying overnight enters the premises.
At this point, it is worthwhile to meander from the hypothetical
world into the real one in order to assess Carter'simplications. Consider
the following "true-life" drama. On a zealous quest to penetrate the Mafia, or La Cosa Nostra, two Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, with
the consent of the Justice Department, terminate one Mafia member's
parole early in order to use him as an informant. 75 They learn from him
and others of an impending La Cosa Nostra ceremony, 76 Soon thereafter, they also discover that their new informant has put out a contract for
another member of the Mafia to be shot. 77 The FBI agents violate Attorney General Guidelines in failing to report the information either to the
local FBI office, FBI headquarters, state or local law enforcement offi78
cials, or the Assistant Attorney General.
Obtaining more details about the induction ceremony from the informant, the agents realize how important recording such an event would
be for future prosecutions and for Congressional hearings. 79 Not wishing
71 Carter,525 U.S. at 96 (Scalia., J., concurring) (quoting Oysted).
72 Id. at 97.
73 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 51 at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
74 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 410

(1969).
75 United States v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 170 (D. Mass. 1999).
76
77
78
79

Id.
Id.
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 171.
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to reveal the informant's identity, however, the agents proceed to seek a
warrant for a "roving bug" under Title III, which requires that the agents
provide to the court "a full and complete statement as why [it] is not
practical to specify the place to be bugged." 80 Although the agents knew
the informant would be at the induction ceremony, and they could
thereby obtain his testimony about it and also record it, they defiantly
concealed this information. As a result, the magistrate issued a warrant
based on a false and misleading affidavit and application.8 1 Under
Franks v. Delaware, the warrant would be invalidated if based on information in the application which the government knew to be false (or in
reckless disregard for the truth) and the information was material to the
82
decision to issue the warrant.
Further, before an application for surveillance with a "roving bug"
under Title III is submitted, the Supreme Court requires the "mature
judgment" of a high-ranking official to approve it. 83 Under either Franks
or Giordano, the government would be on shaky footing in establishing
the validity of the warrant for the roving bug. Thus, it would likely lose a
motion to suppress the evidence regarding the induction ceremony.
Enter the wonderful Carteropinion and things just might look rosier
for the government. Indeed, this is just what occurred in the Salemme
case, described above. On the heels of Carter, the government swiftly
changed its strategy, arguing that one defendant who was overheard and
tape-recorded in the La Cosa Nostra ceremony had no expectation of
privacy in the house where the ceremony occurred.8 4 In a brief passage,
the court accepted the government's contention, emphasizing that the defendant was not an overnight guest and was present merely for "busi85
ness" purposes.
The Salemme case graphically illustrates my position earlier in this
exegesis. However insidious and repulsive an induction ceremony into a
criminal society might be, it is done with the expectation that it will be
an extremely private event. In fact, one of the reasons the FBI agents in
the case lied in order to obtain a roving bug was that they would risk
revealing the informant's identity if they mentioned the locale of the ceremony in the warrant. The simple reason for this apprehension was that
"so few members of [La Cosa Nostra] would have had access to that
86
information."
80 Id., citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1 1)(a)(ii).
81 Id.
82 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

83 United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 505-06 (1974).
84 Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d at 172.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 26.
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After Carter,however, private activities inside the dwelling are no

longer safe from the government's prying eyes or ears. In effect,
Salemme demonstrates that the government might not only be tempted to
look through the blinds, but also to listen with the electronic ear. It can
do so, moreover, with immunity as long as the aggrieved party is a
"short-term" commercial guest in the home. The resident, of course,
bears the indignity of being caught on tape but may take comfort in the
fact that the conversations will not be admissible in a criminal proceeding against her. If the case is sufficiently notorious, however, the homeowner may find her conversations being disclosed in the courtroom as
well as in the print and broadcast media. One wonders at the naivete or
the perversity with which the Carter Court failed to recognize the dangerous ramifications of its facile logic.
Although the FBI agents in Salemme flouted the law unaware that
the Supreme Court would come to their rescue, the case underscores Justice Ginsburg's position in Carter. If Carter had been in effect at the
time the agents acted, it would have furnished them with the incentive to
lie in their application for a warrant, knowing they would not face the
consequences of their actions in regard to suspects who had no previous
connection to the home. This is a recurring theme that the Supreme
Court seems to ignore: tell law enforcement agents that constitutional
constraints are meant to be circumvented and that values seemingly protected by the Constitution place only superficial obstacles in the path of
law enforcement objectives. 8 7 In effect, the Court has fostered the ideal
that rules are malleable instruments subject to manipulation; the ends of
law enforcement justify the means employed in their service.
Ominously, the Carter Court represents an extension of the logic
underlying Rakas to the home. Dissenting in Rakas, Justice White observed that the majority had declared "open season" on automobile passengers by stripping them of the ability to contest the validity of an
automobile search. By analogy, Justice White's analysis now applies to
short-term guests in a house, apartment, or hotel. The police may act in
open defiance of Fourth Amendment doctrine as long as the guests inside
the house are there merely for "commercial" purposes and have no previous relationship to the premises. Though distinct from automobiles, the
regulation and public exposure of which diminish the occupant's expectation of privacy,8 8 the privacy of the home is now vulnerable to illegal
87 See AIfredo Garcia, Toward an Integrated Vision of Criminal ProceduralRights: A
Counter to Judicialand Academic Nihilism, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1993). "[T]he police
[are] taught not to internalize Fourth Amendment norms, but rather to openly flout them." id.
at 23. See also Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461 (1998) [hereinafter Is Miranda Dead].
88 The Court's analysis has centered on the automobile's "ready mobility" and reduced
expectation of privacy because of its characteristics, use, and pervasive regulation. See, e.g.,
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searches as long as a mere short-term commercial guest is admitted. If
Rakas declared "open season" on automobiles, the verdict is already
trickling down to Carter: it has announced "open season" on homes as
well.
Consistent with its previous jurisprudence in relation to the curtilage,8 9 the Court has now ensured that one's dwelling is protected from
governmental surveillance only to the extent it is hermetically sealed. In
Florida v. Riley,90 for example, the Court held that helicopter surveillance of the suspect's curtilage did not infringe upon his expectation of
privacy because the police officer was able to see through the openings
in the greenhouse roof and one or two of its open sides. 91 Despite the
fact that Riley "no doubt intended and expected that his greenhouse
would not be open to public inspection," and that he took precautions to
protect it from ground level observation, those actions did not shield him
92
from governmental surveillance because he left an opening.
Indeed, Justice Brennan's prediction in his Riley dissent has materialized in the Carter opinion. He foreshadowed that Riley might permit
the police to look from the helicopter not only into the open curtilage but
"through an open window into a room viewable only from the air."' 93 As
long as police have the incentive to conduct the search in the hopes that a
short-time, "commercial" guest might be in the room, Carterwould give
police the green light for such a practice. Quoting from Professor Amsterdam's seminal article, 94 Justice Brennan addressed the fundamental
issue Carterhas brought to life: "The question is not whether you and I
must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds before we commit a crime.
It is whether you and I must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds every
time we enter a room, under pain of surveillance if we do not." What
Carter portends is precisely what Professor Amsterdam warned against:
we are not safe in our abodes if we fail to check on the status of our
short-term guests and do not close the blinds tightly when we let them in.
The specter brilliantly depicted in George Orwell's novel, Nineteen
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 465 (1999); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940
(1996); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-394 (1985).
89 The Court has described the curtilage as the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home and has acknowledged that Fourth Amendment protection is accorded to

the curtilage. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). It has yet to determine
just what level of protection the curtilage should be afforded, as opposed to the home itself.
See id. at n.11.
90 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
91 Id. at 450.
92 Id.

93 Id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 403 (1974) [hereinafter Amsterdam], quoted in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Eighty-Four, has arrived. Though referring to a helicopter, his portrait of
the "Police Patrol, snooping into people's windows," has arrived before
95
the millennium.
Law enforcement agencies have much more than the helicopter to
conduct surveillance on unsuspecting citizens inside their dwellings at
the dawn of the new millennium. The advent of new technology has
wrought innovations which permit severe intrusions into the most personal recesses of personal integrity and the privacy of the home. New
law-enforcement technologies on the horizon include cameras capable of
seeing through clothes and most building materials either at close range
or at a distance. 96 One potential revolutionary device, aptly labeled a
"radar skin scanner," reputedly will be able to produce "an anatomically
correct image of the body"-an image that one critic maintains will re97
veal such intimate detail as whether or not a man has been circumcised.
These technological advances will add in the near future to the already
rich repertoire of crime-detection tools available to law enforcement today: infrared scanners, satellite photography, heat radiation sensors, and
a variety of tracking and detection devices. 98
Let us return to my original hypothetical involving President Clinton and Lewinsky. Move forward to the year 2002. Modern technology
has provided law enforcement agents with the radar skin scanner and a
camera capable of seeing through buildings or building materials. Even
if the blinds were not inadvertently left partially open, the police or its
agents could pierce through the blinds and be able to capture the President and Lewinsky engaged in sexual relations. Since Lewinsky was a
short-term guest without an expectation of privacy in the premises, she
would not be able to successfully challenge the admission of what the
scanner and the camera captured. President Clinton would be powerless
to prevent the spectacle depicted in the camera and skin-scanner from
being broadcast to the nation. His mistake was in getting "intimate" with
a short-term rather than a long-term guest.
It is ironic that in 1967, Alan Westin wrote a book entitled Privacy
and Freedom, in which he presciently examined the manifold ramifications of emerging technological innovations.9 9 Delving into the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on the scope of the Fourth Amendment, Westin
reviewed the case law on electronic surveillance, taking into account the
expansion of law enforcement power brought about by the use of surveil95 GEORGE ORWELL, Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four: Text, Sources, Criticism 2 (Irving
Howe ed., Harcourt Brace & World 1963).
96 Mark Hansen, No Place to Hide, 83 A.B.A. J. 45, 46 (1997).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 45.
99 ALAN J. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
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lance devices. 100 Westin foresaw the Supreme Court as being "on the
brink of a landmark ruling defining a comprehensive, positive right of
privacy from unreasonable surveillance."''
Of course, Westin's book
was published in the year the Supreme Court handed down what has
become the baseline of Fourth Amendment law, Katz v. United States. 0 2
How far the Court has traveled since then in either affirming or diverging
from the spirit of Katz has generated considerable debate.' 0 3 Perhaps the
extent to which some commentators perceived the Court's deviation
from the core of Katz was underscored in the pithy title of Professor
Wasserstrom's 1984 article, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment.'0 4 Whether Professor Wasserstrom's analysis is still apt or needs
further emendation merits analysis beyond the scope of this article.
C.

IF THE PRESIDENT IS NOT SAFE, AND NEITHER ARE CITIZENS
WITHIN THEIR HOMES, IN THEIR CARS, OR IN THE STREETS,

Is

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT INCREDIBLY SHRINKING OR IS IT
ON LIFE SUPPORT OR DEAD?

I cannot resist, however, the temptation to engage in a cursory appraisal of such a fundamental question, especially in light of the foregoing critique. My assessment is that the Fourth Amendment is in
jeopardy. I recently offered a similar diagnosis on the vaunted Miranda
doctrine, concluding that Miranda, the "patient," was either clinically
dead or on life support.' 0 5 Three cases serve to underline such a bleak
conclusion for the Fourth Amendment. First, let us discuss Carter.
1. Carter: The Death Knell for the Privacy Lodestar and Why
Clinton Was Mistaken When He Thought His Actions Were
"Private"
Lurking behind my hypothetical and real-life examples is a simple
outgrowth of Carter: the incentive for police officers to dispense with a
search warrant for a dwelling. To a certain degree, Carter augurs the
demise of the warrant requirement for the home because it strips the
100 See id. at 349-60.
101 Id. at 360.
102 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
103 See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465 (1984) (defending the Court's abandonment of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test when probable cause to search is based on

information provided by informants); Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of
Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171 (1983) (critiquing the Court's jurisprudence); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257 (1984) (assailing the Court's jurisprudence) [hereinafter Wasserstrom].
104 Wasserstrom, supra note 103.
105 See Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, supra note 87, at 462.
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home of its security based upon the status of those invited within.
Though some scholars have argued that the text of the Fourth Amendment does not demand a warrant but was historically designed by the
Framers to prevent abusive warrants, the current Supreme Court doctrine, based on Katz, rejects that proposition. That argument may be rendered moot by the Court's decisions shrinking the privacy accorded both
the home and the curtilage, or the area immediately surrounding the
house. It is quite evident that the Supreme Court will protect the house
or the curtilage only when the occupant makes sure that every nook and
cranny is completely sealed from public view, whether that view be furtive or open.
Having a property interest in the house, hotel or apartment searched,
moreover, will not necessarily mean that the claimant will be successful
in establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. Consider the following facts: you give a companion money to rent a hotel
room; she registers the room in her name, and you occupy the room
jointly. You place clothes, toiletries and other assorted personal items in
the room. After renting the room, you leave to run errands and intermittently spend approximately two to three hours in the room. The police
receive an anonymous tip that drugs are being sold out of your room.
Your companion rented the room at approximately 12:00 p.m. and the
search occurred at approximately 9:00 p.m. When police burst into the
room, they find drugs inside and arrest you for various drug offenses. At
the time of the arrest, you had a key to the hotel room in your pocket.
The police had neither a search warrant nor consent to enter the room.
The critical question after Carter is: do you have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room or will you be unable to contest the validity
of the search because you fail the Rakas-Cartertest?
Partially modified to fit within my analysis, this is what transpired
in Wichita, Kansas on the night of January 11, 1997.106 Appealing the
denial of his motion to suppress in the District Court, Michael Gordon
sought a reversal in the Circuit Court of Appeals. 10 7 Applying Carterto
the facts of the case, the appellate court found that Gordon had not established an expectation of privacy in the hotel room. 10 8 Citing the fact that
Gordon never claimed the room key found in his pocket was his, the
court reasoned that "'mere physical possession or control of property'...
[is] insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy." 10 9 In
addition, although Gordon testified that he had given his companion
money to rent the room, he gave no testimony confirming his asserted
106 See United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
107

Id.

108 Id. at 1226-27.
109 Id. at 1227 (citations omitted).
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The court speculated that Gordon may have merely

owed or loaned his companion the money to rent the room, and was not
staying there as her guest.Il Further, Gordon failed to establish that the
clothes or toiletries belonged to him; the court again surmised the items
could have belonged to another male occupant." 12 Analogizing to the
facts of Carter,the court emphasized that the defendant had confessed he
had been in the hotel for an illicit "business" purpose: that is, to deal
drugs.'1 3 Finally, the court stressed the fact that, at best, Gordon had
14
been in the hotel room for a total of two hours.'
The keys to the kingdom will not, in short, give you a sufficient
interest in the dwelling. Employing Rakas's language, it would be fair to
assume that a short-term, commercial "guest qua guest" will never have
an expectation of privacy inside a dwelling. And that means that the
Court has indeed, as Justice White put it in Rakas, declared "open season" on dwellings. Though some may consider this conclusion hyperbolic, I believe that time will confirm my dismal assessment, In fact,
both Salemme and Gordon demonstrate how the government may successfully invoke Carter's logic to justify warrantless searches of
dwellings.
Furthermore, what those two cases reveal is that Carter may not
only invite abuses by law enforcement but also encourage intentional
misconduct by police. Indeed, Carterseriously undermines the rationale
of the Court in Steagald v. United States." 5 In Steagald,the police had
no search warrant for Steagald's home but entered his home based on an
arrest warrant for a fugitive whom they had some cause to believe was in
the home. 1 6 The Court held that an arrest warrant did not sufficiently
.protect the Fourth Amendment rights of third parties not named in the
warrant when their homes are searched without either consent or exigent
circumstances.' 17

It is rather intriguing that the government argued to the Supreme
Court that Steagald had no expectation of privacy in the searched home.
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, rejected the government's
claim because it had taken diametrically opposed positions in the lower
courts, had "acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts," and had
"failed to raise such questions in a timely fashion during the litiga110

Id.

Id.
112 Id.
'''

1'3 Id.
'"4

Id.

''5 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
116 Id. at 211-13.
'17

Id.at 213-14.
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tion."118 Imagine the incentive the government would have today in rais-

ing the issue. If Steagald was merely a short-term, commercial guest
under Carter,he would not be able to invoke the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule. The government, employing an arrest
warrant, would have entered without a search warrant and reaped the
benefit of a large cache of drugs: forty-three pounds of cocaine to be
precise. 119
More important, law enforcement has an incentive to violate a
homeowner's privacy, and it is this incentive that provided the impetus
for Steagald's rationale. Justice Marshall maintained that if the police
could search a third party's home for the subject of an arrest warrant, a
dangerous invitation to the police would arise. As he eloquently argued,
"[a]rmed solely with an arrest warrant for a single person, the police
could search all the homes of that individual's friends and acquaintances."' 120 Carter's rationale goes beyond what the Steagald majority
contemplated and sought to forestall. To borrow from Steagald's language, armed with nothing but perhaps a hunch that criminal activity
may occur inside a particular dwelling, law enforcement may enter the
premises as long as they either know beforehand or learn after the search
that a third party who enters the dwelling is merely a short-term commercial guest who will not be able to invoke Fourth Amendment safeguards.
In the process, law enforcement agents are free to invade the security of
the occupant, whose only remedy is the Fourth Amendment ifshe is involved in criminal activity. In the meantime, her privacy has been
breached without the substantive justification the Fourth Amendment
requires.
Paradoxically, Justice Scalia's acerbic concurring opinion in Carter
is oblivious to the pragmatic ramifications of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Deriding the Katz standard as "fuzzy,"'121 and extolling his "textual" analysis, Justice Scalia observes that the Katz
expectation of privacy has been perverted to fit the Justices' individual
conceptions of what the Fourth Amendment should protect. It is a "selfindulgent" test that in his words "has no plausible foundation in the text
of the Fourth Amendment."' 122 In short, reasonable expectations of privacy "bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that
1 23
this Court considers reasonable."'
118 Id.at 209.

119 Id. at 207. This is precisely what happened in Steagald. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower courts' denials of Steagald's motion to suppress and held that Steagald's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. Id.
120 Id. at 215.
121 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
122 Id. at 97.
123 Id.
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Should Justice Scalia's criticism be taken seriously when there is
preciously little left of "reasonable expectations of privacy" that the
Court is prepared to recognize? Perhaps Justice Scalia just cannot tell
when he has won. It is more elegant, I suppose, to revel in "history" and
"text" than it is to rely on a "fuzzy" standard. As Thomas Jefferson
would say, Justice Scalia views the Constitution "with sanctimonious
reverence," as the "ark of the covenant," "too sacred to be touched." As
for Jefferson, he stated well after the founding that what the Framers of
the Constitution lacked was the "experience of the present, "and that
"forty years of experience in government is worth a century of bookreading .... ,,124 Despite Justice Scalia's rejoinder in Carter, the American people are surely less "secure" in their homes when the opinion's
implications are fully explored. A member of a cultural elite without
knowledge of the "real world" of criminal law, however, is hardly expected to appreciate the nuances of his "lofty" opinions. Rather, Justice
Scalia's solution is to depend on the whim of the majorities (legislatures)
that Madison so viscerally distrusted.
Let us move from Justice Scalia back to President Clinton. During
the course of his deposition in the Paula Jones case, the President revealed the paranoia he felt due to the outlandish accusations the "far
25
right" had leveled in the course of the 1996 presidential campaign.
This prompted his vain attempt to keep a certain modicum of privacy in
the Oval Office. The President stated that, "[t]here are no curtains on the
Oval Office, there are no curtains on my private office, there are no curtains or blinds that can close the windows in my private dining room ....
There is a peephole in the office that George Stephanopoulos and then
Rahm Emanuel occupied .... ,11 2 6 The President was responding to Ms.
Jones' attorney's suggestion that he conducted the affair with Monica
Lewinsky in the kitchen behind the Oval Office. 127 Arguably, this was
the only private "sanctuary" for the President.
Mere curtains, as we have seen, would not have kept the President's
behavior from the glare of public scrutiny. Any "opening" would have
precluded such a claim. Even if sealed, the curtains would not have protected the President's privacy if Lewinsky had decided to cooperate with
the Office of Independent Counsel. The President, a lawyer trained at
one of the premier legal institutions in the United States, could scarcely
be faulted for not divining that the United States Supreme Court would
render curtains, in some circumstances, superfluous to a claim for pri124
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127 Id.
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vacy. In short, the Supreme Court, in its august wisdom, has simply
decided that some matters, no matter how "private," are not worthy of
constitutional protection.
From a normative standpoint, Carter provides an answer to Professor Amsterdam's prescient query regarding "how tightly the Fourth
Amendment permits people to be driven back into the recesses of their
lives by the risk of surveillance."' 28 Dissenting in Riley, Justice Brennan
believed that that was the true issue in the case. 129 That case merely
involved the curtilage rather than the dwelling. 130 Ultimately, Carter
takes the analysis one step further by reaching the home. The answer to
Professor Amsterdam's question is deceptively simple: the Fourth
Amendment now requires that people tightly recede into the interior of
their homes and carefully monitor whom they invite into that deep
recess.
Forget the Car and the Streets: Privacy is Not Part of the
Equation

2.

Professor James J. Tomkovicz wrote an article in 1992 in which he
foresaw that the Court's opinion in Californiav. Acevedo 13 1 augured the
demise of the warrant requirement. 132 His prediction, as we have seen in
Carter,has been fulfilled to a great degree. But another case decided in
the same term as Carter complements Acevedo's premise. In Wyoming
v. Houghton,13 3 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, extended the

scope of the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement. Reversing the
Wyoming Supreme Court, the Houghton majority held that police officers with probable cause to search an automobile "may inspect passengers' belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the
object of the search."' 134 In the process, the Court upheld a search of the
purse belonging to a car passenger who was not suspected of criminal
activity. That is, the Houghton majority sanctioned the search of a
highly personal "repository"'' 35 belonging to a person whom they had no
128 Amsterdam, supra note 94, at 402.
129 488 U.S. at 466.
130

Id.

131 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
132 James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103 (1992).
133 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
134 Id. at 307.
135 In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer recognized that purses are "special containers"
that harbor personal items in which the owner would have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
He felt constrained, however, to side with the majority by the force of precedent. Id. at 308
(Breyer, J., concurring). Breyer's point of distinction was not the type of container but rather
"the fact that it was separate from the person." Id.
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probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe was involved in criminal activity.
Distinguishing United States v. Di Re, 136 in which the Court held
that probable cause to search a car did not extend to a body search of the
passenger, Justice Scalia made the outlandish claim that "[s]uch traumatic consequences are not to be expected when the police examine an
item of personal property found in a car."' 137 How divorced must Justice
Scalia be from reality? Or must we ascribe this statement to outright
disingenuousness? Would a passenger in a car not suffer trauma when
the personal items of her purse are revealed to a perfect stranger, perhaps
of the opposite sex? Would rummaging through such items as personal
letters, prescription drugs, birth-control pills, or other "private" items not
cause "traumatic consequences"? Or is the protection of the Fourth
Amendment dependent upon the passenger taking the purse out of the car
and keeping it attached to her person?
Notice the utter disconnect with reality that the Houghton majority
displays. Would the police officer who is going to search the car permit
the passenger to exit the car with her purse? More likely, to ensure his or
her safety, the officer would prohibit the passenger from taking the purse
outside the vehicle. 138 At that point, the purse, briefcase, or wallet would
remain in the car subject to being searched if the object of the search
could be located therein. From a practical standpoint, the Court would
probably not prevent the police officer from removing the item to ensure
his or her safety. That being the case, Di Re's holding becomes a dead
letter.
Even if the Court were to decide that police officers could not, consistent with a need to protect themselves, order passengers with personal
items to leave the items inside the vehicle, defendants are unlikely to
succeed in convincing trial courts that they unsuccessfully attempted to
exit the car with their personal effects. Consider the case of Idaho v.
Newsom. 139 Newsom was the passenger in a car stopped for a minor
traffic violation. A search revealed outstanding felony warrants for the
driver. 140 The arresting officer asked Newsom to get out of the vehicle.
At the suppression hearing, the testimony was conflicted on whether she
sought to exit the car with her purse. According to Newsom's testimony,
she attempted to get out of the car with her purse, but the officer instructed her to leave the purse in the vehicle. The officer testified that
136 332 U.S. 581, 586-87 (1948).
137 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303.
138 Indeed, this is precisely what occurred in State v. Steele, 2000 S.D. 78, available at
2000 S.D. LEXIS 81 (2000).

139 1997 Ida. App. LEXIS 116 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997), rev'd 1998 Ida. LEXIS 143 (1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1158 (1999).
140 id. at 1-2.
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Newsom left the car without the purse. A search of the purse revealed a
small blue coin purse that contained methamphetamine.' 4' Who will win
the swearing match between the police officer and the defendant? The
answer is obvious: the police officer will win the match ninety-nine per142
cent of the time.
A passenger in a car takes the risk, therefore, that whatever personal
container she places inside the vehicle will be searched if the police develop probable cause to search the car. As the facts in Houghton demonstrate, a mere traffic violation could place a passenger's personal items at
risk of being searched. In Houghton, the driver of the car was stopped
for speeding and driving with a faulty brake light. 143 The police officer
who effected the stop noticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver's
pocket and asked him why he had it, which elicited the candid response,
"to take drugs." 144 At that point, the officer had probable cause to search
the car and Ms. Houghton's purse suddenly lost its character as a "private" repository.
Furthermore, the police need not have probable cause to search the
vehicle in order to search the personal items belonging to the passengers.
Rather, the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement
obviates the need for probable cause to search the car's passenger com46
145
partment under New York v. Belton and United States v. Robinson.1
That brings us to the proposition that police may arrest the driver of the
vehicle for a minor traffic offense and then proceed to thoroughly search
the passenger compartment, including a passenger's private repositories,
without any probable cause whatsoever to believe any items of criminality will be found inside the car or the purse. This authority is predicated
upon the legal fiction the Court created in Belton: the passenger compartId. at

2.
In connection with the Miranda warnings, Justice Souter has confirmed this truism. In
Davis v. United States, he noted, "when an inculpatory statement has been obtained as a result
of an unrecorded, incommunicado interrogation ... officers rarely lose 'swearing matches'
against criminal defendants at suppression hearings." 512 U.S. 454, 474 n.7 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring). Of course, the same holds true of an encounter in the street witnessed only by the
police and the suspect. The trial judge must decide whom she will believe, and the natural
inclination is to credit the officer's testimony rather than that of the defendant. In reversing
the lower court opinion, however, the Idaho Supreme Court saw the facts of Newsom in a
different vein. It credited the defendant's testimony that the second officer at the scene requested she leave the purse in the car and that the officer merely testified that the passenger
left the vehicle without her purse. Therefore, her testimony to the effect that she involuntarily
left the purse in the car was "undisputed." Idaho v. Newsom, 1998 Ida. LEXIS 143, at 6-7.
143 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 297.
141

142

144

See id. at 298.

145 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that a search incident to a valid arrest extends to the

interior passenger compartment of the car and to any open or closed containers, including the
glove compartment, but does not extend to the trunk).
146 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (extending the search incident-to-arrest exception to misde-

meanor non-evidentiary traffic offenses).
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ment of the vehicle will be presumed to be within the immediate control
47
of a recent occupant of the car.1
Indeed, as an appellate court has aptly noted, "[n]othing in... Belton requires that the area and containers searched within the reach of the
arrestee must be the personal property of the arrestee."' 14 8 Given the
"bright-line" rule rationale undergirding Belton, it is consistent not to
circumscribe the area of the search based on the ownership of the
container. 149 Houghton's reasoning amply supports this conclusion.
We are, however, confronted with a putative irony: the Rehnquist
Court's implied authorization of unwarranted searches of vehicles when
police officers issue citations for minor traffic violations in lieu of an
arrest. Refusing to broaden Belton and Robinson's reach, the Court held
in Knowles v. Iowa' 50 that a police officer may not conduct a "full
search" of the car if he decides to issue a citation instead of arresting the
driver.' 5 1 But the Court left open an important question: whether the
police may arrest a motorist for a minor traffic offense and thus conduct
a full search of the vehicle under the search-incident-to-arrest exception
to the warrant requirement. Herein lies the key to Knowles's force and
effect: either it constitutes a genuine safeguard or it is merely a paper
tiger.
The Knowles Court provided a strong hint that the opinion was not
meant to constrain a state's discretion in selecting the range of arrestable
offenses. The Iowa statute at issue in Knowles permits police officers to
arrest a motorist upon probable cause to believe she has violated "any
traffic or motor vehicle equipment law."' 152 Justice Rehnquist made it
clear that Knowles was not contesting whether the statute could be "lawfully applied," thus skirting the issue whether a jurisdiction may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, permit police officers to arrest
motorists for minor traffic or motor vehicle equipment violations. 53
Given the emphatic tone with which Justice Rehnquist noted Knowles's
failure to assail the Iowa statute's validity, it is safe to conclude that the
Knowles decision is indeed a paper tiger.
The Court's opinion in Atwater v. Lago Vista unmistakably confirms that Knowles is a paper tiger.' 54 Writing for the majority, Justice
147 This is the rationale adopted by the South Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Steele,
2000 S.D. 78, 2000 S.D. LEXIS 81.
148 Idaho v. Newsom, 1997 Ida.App. LEXIS 116 at 7 (citations omitted).
149 See id.
150 525 U.S. 113 (1998), as amended October 21, 1999.
151 Id.at 114.
152 Id. at 115 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.485(1)(a) (West 1997)).
153 Id.at H 6.
154 Atwater v. Lago Vista, No. 99-1408, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 3366 (U.S. April 24, 2001), to
be published at 532 U.S. 318.
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Souter observed that "[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed a very minor criminal offense in his presence,
he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender."' 155 If the arresting officer in Knowles had opted to effect an
arrest rather than issuing a citation to the offender, then the search incident to the custodial arrest would have been valid.
Coupled with Whren's directive that probable cause is an objective
concept and that the subjective motivations of a police officer, however
malevolent, are irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analyses, 156 Knowles
bodes ill for a citizen who dares to accept a ride as a passenger in a car
and bring a personal item with her. She must assume the risk that, upon
the driver's commission of any traffic violation, her privacy interests in a
personal item vanishes. Only in those jurisdictions not following Iowa's
scheme is any motorist, whether driver or passenger, protected from a
search and seizure of a private repository upon a violation of a minor
traffic infraction. As the petitioners argued in Whren, "'the multitude of
applicable traffic and equipment regulations' is so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone is guilty of a violation, permitting the police to single out almost whomever they wish for a stop.' 57 An
expansive statute like Iowa's radically expands Whren's scope by allowing a search and seizure of the car and personal items within it, affording police officers unfettered discretion in determining whom they
will arrest so that they can search the car. Racial profiling and invidious
discrimination would be given full rein under this insidious scheme. But
the Court's remedy for this ill is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment. 158 Such a remedy is not adequate within the criminal justice context.
More revealing is Justice Scalia's language in Whren suggesting
that the minor infractions for which the petitioners were stopped could
potentially lead to an arrest. Citing Robinson, Justice Scalia noted that "a
traffic-violation arrest (of the sort here) would not be rendered invalid by
the fact that it was a 'mere pretext for a narcotics search. ''59 What
Justice Scalia implied was that a jurisdiction would be free to make such
minor offenses as not giving a signal when turning, driving too fast for
160
conditions, and not paying attention to the operation of the vehicle,
155 Id. at *63 (emphasis added).
156 Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (asserting that the proper remedy for selective enforcement of traffic or criminal statutes based on individual racial factors is the Equal Protec-

tion Clause, not the Fourth Amendment).
157
158
159
160

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
These

818.
813.
812-13 (emphasis added).
three traffic violations purportedly justified the stop of petitioners by plainclothes police officers in Whren. See id. at 810 (citations omitted).
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arrestable offenses. If that is the case, then Knowles is a dead letter, a
mere blip on the screen that permits the police to search vehicles and
their contents at will.
Suspend your disbelief for a moment while we return to the affair
that nearly brought down the President of the United States. Imagine
that the President and Lewinsky sought a different venue for their sexual
escapades. The President managed to shake off the Secret Service and
get away from the White House with Lewinsky in a custom van (belonging to the Secret Service) with airtight privacy and a full-length bed located toward the back of the vehicle. They proceeded to a quiet,
suburban, Washington, D.C. neighborhood in the early hours of the
morning (around 1 to 2 a.m.), where they park the vehicle. Lewinsky is
sloppy in parking the van, letting one of the tires protrude onto the
sidewalk.
The "alien" van arouses the suspicion of a curious and concerned
neighbor, who calls the police because she believes potential burglars
may be ready to strike the neighborhood. Two police officers respond to
the scene, spot the van, and notice that it is parked in violation of a city
ordinance that prohibits any part of a vehicle from resting on the sidewalk. One of the officers taps the side door of the van to get the occupant's attention. Lewinsky nervously responds by opening the door and
asking the officers how she can assist them. One officer asks Lewinsky
what she is doing in the neighborhood and immediately notices there is a
bed in the back of the van and a person, who looks like the President, in
the back of the van. Lewinsky is so startled that she fails to respond to
the officers' inquiry.
Concerned not only with the safety of the neighborhood, but also
with the well-being of the President, and his safety as well as that of his
partner, the officer requests identification from Lewinsky, shines his
flashlight inside the van, and draws his service revolver. Lewinsky fumbles around the van looking for identification while the President tries to
conceal his face from the officers. After Lewinsky fails to produce the
identification, the officer requests that she and the President exit the van.
Startled to see the President, the officer asks if he has been harmed. The
President, embarrassed by the ordeal, assures the police officer he is perfectly fine. At this point, one officer enters the van without consent and
finds Lewinsky's purse. Inside the purse, the officer looks for Lewinsky's identification and in the course of doing so inadvertently comes
across love letters she has written to the President in which she discusses
their "affair."
Is the officer's search legal? The facts I have just set forth, fictional
though they may be in regard to the President and Lewinsky, are adapted
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from a California case, People v. Hart.16 1 The California appellate court
held that the police were justified in going into the van because the occupant had not found identification, though she had spent several minutes
unsuccessfully looking for it, and the officers had a right to search the
van for the identification and for weapons. 162 Quoting from Houghton,
the majority said the officer could look for the identification in the purse
because "the critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner
of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are located
163
on the property to which entry is sought."'
While the Hart court may have stretched Houghton to its outer limits, the result the majority reached is not implausible. In Houghton, the
police had probable cause to believe they might find contraband inside
the car. The police in Hart, though they had no initial probable cause,
did think it suspicious that the defendant had no identification and could
not offer a reasonable explanation for her presence in the neighborhood.
They thus had a reasonable basis for searching those places where the
identification might be located: that is, the purse. Of course, the majority's premise is founded on the notion that if a traffic violation occurred
(parking on the sidewalk), the officer was justified in asking the presumed driver for identification. Indeed, the California Vehicle Code permits the police to detain and cite a person for violating the code. 164
Aside from Houghton, the police may have searched the van if the
jurisdiction, like Iowa, had afforded officers the discretion to arrest the
defendant for a minor traffic infraction. Then, the police could search
not only the purse, but also any containers, open or closed, including the
glove compartment, within the van. Since the entire van constitutes the
"passenger compartment," Belton and Robinson would place no restrictions on the officer's ability to search the vehicle or its contents. Notice
again how probable cause to search the van is irrelevant under the exception for searches incident to a valid arrest. A trivial violation of the traffic code gives police unfettered authority to search the intimate contents
of "private repositories." Let the citizen beware lest such private effects
suddenly metamorphose into public ones when placed inside a "not so
private" vehicle.
The final blow to Fourth Amendment safeguards for the "people"
comes to us in the Wardlow165 opinion. It is fitting that the opinion was
issued just twelve days after the arrival of the new millennium. Portend161 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762 (App. Div. 1999).
162 Id. at 769.
163 Id. at 768, quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295.
164 Id. at 766 (citations omitted).
165 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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ing a narrow perspective on Fourth Amendment protections, the decision
brings to full life Professor Maclin's prophetic 1990 article, which was
entitled The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment
on the Streets. 166 Professor Maclin emphasized the contradiction between the ascending value of privacy in the Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment and its devaluation of liberty "to walk the streets"
and travel "free from arbitrary government intrusion."' 67 Indeed, the
freedom of "locomotion" and "personal integrity" are no longer simply
jeopardized; they are on the verge of extinction in the wake of Wardlow.
The Wardlow majority sanctioned the detention of an individual
who flees upon sight of the police in a "high crime area."' 168 Rejecting
the twin propositions that mere "unprovoked flight" at the sight of the
police or presence in a high crime area by itself justified detention of an
individual in the streets, the Court unanimously opted for a "totality of
the circumstances" approach to the issue whether reasonable suspicion
exists to detain a citizen in public.' 69 In combination, however, these
two factors add up to sufficient cause to interfere with the freedom of a
citizen to run through the public streets or places. Unfortunately, this
"fuzzy" standard, to borrow Justice Scalia's phrase in Carter, leaves
many gaps for the police to find cause to detain.
Let us take one common example. The Supreme Court has identified airports in large metropolitan areas as major sites for drug trafficking. 170 Does Wardlow mean that if a citizen begins running through the
concourse in order to purchase a ticket, check-in, or get to the departure
gate, and simultaneously makes eye-contact with a uniformed police officer, the officer will have reasonable suspicion to detain that individual
against her will? Presumably, the two determinative factors at issue in
Wardlow are present here: unprovoked flight and a "high crime" area.
Aside from a mere consensual encounter with a police officer that does
not rise to the level of a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes, now
the police would have the right to forcibly detain the individual for
questioning.
Imagine Lewinsky running through the Washington, D.C. or Los
Angeles airport and being detained by a uniformed police officer who is
working under the aegis of the Office of Independent Counsel. He be166 Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on
the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990).
167 Id. at 1259. Professor Maclin argued that the Court's misplaced emphasis on privacy
ignored the otherwise discrete but important values of locomotion and personal integrity. Id.
at 1327-33.
168 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
169 Id. at 136.
170 See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980).
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gins questioning her about her actions. She nervously fumbles for identification in her purse. While attempting to retrieve her identification, a
paperback copy of a book given to her by the President falls to the floor,
showing the inside jacket signed by the President. What a find for
Starr's investigation into the President's sexual activities with Lewinsky!
Indeed, to the extent the officer would have reasonable suspicion to stop
Lewinsky at the outset, rather than relying on the consensual nature of
the encounter, 71 he might also be able to articulate grounds to frisk her,
172
as well as her belongings, for weapons pursuant to Terry v. Ohio.
Wardlow suggests that the police officer might be justified in
searching through Lewinsky's purse for weapons. In Wardlow, during a
patdown search for weapons, the officer who ultimately arrested Wardlow "squeezed the bag respondent was carrying and felt a heavy, hard
object similar to the shape of a gun. The officer then opened the bag and
discovered ... a handgun."'' 73 Though the Supreme Court did not grant
certiorari on the frisk issue in Wardlow,174 had it done so it might have
been inclined to support the officer's decision to frisk Wardlow's bag.
By combining flight from a police officer and presence in a "high
crime area" as factors giving rise to reasonable suspicion to seize an individual, the Wardlow Court gave prominence to elements that are inherently ambiguous. As I have demonstrated in the context of the ClintonLewinsky affair, many Americans could be subjected to seizures if the
mere fortuitous combination of these two elements provided justification
to seize citizens in public places. A host of reasons, as Justice Stevens
points out in his Wardlow dissent, may prompt an individual to run: "to
catch up with a friend a block or two away, to seek shelter from an
impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get
home in time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to avoid
contact with a bore or a bully, or simply to answer the call of nature
....
Of course, any of these reasons "may coincide with the arrival
17 6
of an officer in the vicinity."'
More importantly, Wardlow is bound to adversely affect minority
persons' "right to locomotion." Negative encounters with the police, racial profiling, and residing in "high crime areas" for socioeconomic reasons render minorities especially vulnerable to Wardlow's facile
171 The standard for a Fourth Amendment seizure was set forth in Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Mendenhall. A consensual encounter between an individual and the police

becomes a seizure when a show of official authority would lead a reasonable person to believe
she was not free to leave. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
172 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
173 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122.
t74

Id. at 124 n.2.

175 Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176

Id.
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reach. 177 Either blithely or disingenuously ignorant of these implications, the Wardlow majority continues a trend established by Whren: the
Fourth Amendment has no relevance in ferreting out potentially invidious discrimination in law enforcement. Rather, some other constitutional
remedy, such as the Equal Protection Clause, is the appropriate avenue
for redress.
D.
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FETISH FOR PRIVACY": THE SUPREME COURT IN THE NEW

MILLENNIUM

Thirty-four years after Katz and Alan Westin's pathbreaking book,
Privacy and Freedom, we find a Supreme Court openly contemptuous of
the notion of privacy embodied in these two tracts. Justice Scalia has
expressed his disdain for Katz; other members of the Court profess adherence to its fundamental tenets while undermining the very principle
Katz fostered. However the Court might wish to rationalize its drift, it
cannot escape the reality that its definition of privacy would not have
guarded the most private consensual sexual encounter, between the President of the United States and a White House intern, from the public
glare.
Judge Starr does not, therefore, bear the sole responsibility for what
Orlando Patterson classified as the "wanton" invasion of the President's
privacy. It is, rather, the Rehnquist Court's evisceration of the value of
privacy as an essential ingredient of the Fourth Amendment which stands
as the metaphor for the Starr investigation and its revelation of the lurid
sexual details of the President's sexual life. The pendulum of privacy
had swung markedly in the course of the three decades between Katz and
the Clinton-Lewinsky affair. Privacy is not a value the Supreme Court
collectively holds in high esteem, Katz's continued validity to the contrary notwithstanding. Perhaps an analogy to the Miranda doctrine is apt
for Katz: privacy as a Fourth Amendment value is either on life support,
78
dead, or irrelevant.1
There are those who would question whether privacy ought to be
the Fourth Amendment's principal concern. Justice Scalia, for example,
has unequivocally voiced disdain for the Katz approach and would perhaps return to the pre-Katz scheme in which the Amendment protects
property rather than privacy. In a recent article, Professor William
Stuntz has called for a rejection of privacy as the lodestar of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence because such a perspective unduly advantages
1 79
the rich and adversely affects the poor and blacks.
177 Id. at 132-33.

178 See Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, supra note 87.
179 William J. Stuntz, The Distributionof Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV.

1265 (1999).
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The crux of Professor Stuntz's argument is that "[t]he targets of
police searches and seizures tend to be relatively poor."' 180 Accordingly,
"[p]rivacy is an interest whose importance grows with one's bank account, or one's square footage." 18 1 Professor Stuntz ends the syllogism
by arguing that since most searches and seizures occur "on the street, far
from the world of bedroom closets and telephone conversations," the
poor and minorities have little protection from the privacy safeguarded
by the Fourth Amendment. 182 It is difficult to disagree with such an
obvious proposition. Where Professor Stuntz's analysis misses the mark
is in its blind acceptance of the proposition that the "middle class" still
enjoys wide protection from the privacy rationale underlying Katz.
Stuntz observes that "homes are almost the only place where the
warrant requirement remains meaningful."' 183 I have shown that postCarter, the home is no longer subject to the protection of the warrant
requirement if a "short-term, commercial" visitor happens to be invited
by the host inside the premises. Presumably, this principle remains regardless of the "square footage" of the home. Indeed, the Salemme case
demonstrates how an affluent "mob" house can be safely invaded without the benefit of a warrant if the police merely wish to collect evidence
against "mobsters" who have, at most, a "fleeting" and obviously commercial tie to the home. The same principle would hold sway in a house
obtained with illicit profits from the drug trade in an upper middle-class
neighborhood. Police officers have an incentive after Carter to infringe
upon the privacy of the home without a warrant in the hope of at least
securing evidence against those involved in the trade who are "shortterm" guests. The Carter rationale extends beyond the poor, two-bit
dealer; it also covers the high-level operative or, potentially, the kingpin
of a drug organization.
Another major flaw underlies Stuntz's argument. Contrary to his
assertion, "middle class" bank accounts are not necessarily safe from
government scrutiny. Under its "assumption of risk" analysis, the Court
has determined that if we divulge information to a third party, such as a
bank, even with the expectation that it would not be revealed to other
184
parties, we have forsaken our privacy interest in that information.
Given the potential and vast range of modern technology, moreover,
180
181
182
183
184

Id.at 1289.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1269.
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735-36 (1979) (no expectation of privacy
in telephone numbers dialed because they are conveyed to a third-party, i.e., the telephone
company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no expectation of privacy in bank
accounts even if the information is divulged with the assumption that the third party will not

betray the confidence).
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there is no telling how much the privacy of a home may be subject to
invasion by the police regardless of its "square footage."
The telling aspect of Professor Stuntz's article, and the rejoinders by
two prominent criminal justice scholars, 85 is the assumption that privacy
is still protected despite the Court's eradication of Katz's spirit and letter.
As to its class bias, it is obvious that to the extent the Court treats privacy
as a scarce commodity it also ignores the class implications of its decisions. When privacy as a Fourth Amendment value recedes almost to the
point of obliteration, it becomes difficult to sustain the argument that it
protects even the middle and upper classes. We must ask the most powerful, upper-middle class person in the United States, President William
Jefferson Clinton, whether he could have expected privacy in the White
House when he was having an affair with a young, upper-middle-class
intern. Mr. President, I am afraid to tell you that Chief Justice Rehnquist
and his Court just might answer that you may have expected privacy, but
Lewinsky would not (at the very least for the first encounter); and there,
vicariously, goes any right to privacy you might have if she decides to
speak to law-enforcement agents. And Professor Stuntz, the Court does
indeed evince a class-bias in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. I
would not, however, be confident of your ability to convince either the
distinguished sociologist Orlando Patterson or the President of the
United States of your argument.
II.

"TERROR IN ROOM 1012"

Another lesson we collectively learned as a nation during the impeachment saga is the degree to which any person may become the victim of law enforcement tactics designed to pressure a suspect to confess
her crime. The experience also reminds us that the right to counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment is a tenuous privilege. 186 Lewinsky tells
of the horror she faced as she unwittingly confronted FBI agents and Ken
Starr's deputies at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Arlington, Virginia.1 87 Her
biographer, Andrew Morton, describes that grueling twelve-hour session
with Starr's deputies as the "Terror in Room 1012."188
Two leading commentators diverge on the issue of whether Starr's
subordinates violated constitutional tenets during the interrogation session. Judge Posner believes that had Lewinsky made incriminating state185 Louis Michael Seidman, Making the Best of Fourth Amendment Law: A Comment on
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1296 (1999); Carol
S. Steiker, "How Much Justice Can You Afford? "-A Response to Stuntz, 67 GEO. WASH. L.

The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67
REv. 1290 (1999).
186 See Garcia, supra note 6.
187 ANDREW MORTON, MONICA'S STORY at

188 Id.

at 175.

219-41 (1999).
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ments during the episode at room 1012, they might have been excluded
from evidence as "having been obtained by coercion."' 189 But even if
that had occurred, Posner believes the tactics of Starr's deputies constituted at most "harmless error." 190 On the other hand, Jeffrey Toobin
contends that "Lewinsky's treatment in the hotel room was entirely appropriate for an important witness in an unfolding criminal investigation."1 9 1 Toobin is, I believe, just plain wrong. Judge Posner misses the
point through his hypertechnical, myopic, and consequentialist philosophy characteristic of the Rehnquist Court. In the final analysis, however,
these two distinguished legal analysts fail to acknowledge how "fair-process" is no longer part of the "criminal justice system." Rather, the Clinton-Lewinsky affair is redolent of an earlier time in the criminal process
where the emphasis lay on getting results at any cost. Therefore, it is not
surprising that a jurist and a former prosecutor ignore the deleterious
impact of judicial decisions that invite law enforcement agents to evade
legal constraints in ferreting out crime. Indeed, the Court has encouraged deception, lying, and implicitly, coercion, in the service of the
finality of a criminal conviction. Perhaps the new apothegm for the system ought to be the "criminal system" without the "justice" appended to
it.
Let us delve into the "horror in room 1012" with two questions:
whether law enforcement agents did employ coercive tactics that would
have violated Lewinsky's right against self-incrimination; and the related
question whether the agents subverted either the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel or ethical, self-imposed proscriptions against dealing with a
suspect who has retained counsel to represent her on a legal matter.
A.

WHAT HAPPENED IN ROOM

1012?

DOES IT MATTER?

Most suspects do not enjoy the luxury of being represented by an
attorney when confronted by law enforcement agents bent on extracting a
confession from them or obtaining their cooperation as a means of securing evidence against a higher-level operative. When Lewinsky encountered two FBI agents in the Pentagon City Mall that fateful day of
January 16, 1998, she immediately told them she wanted to speak with
her lawyer, Frank Carter.1 92 Of course, the objective of the Office of the
Independent Counsel was to get Lewinsky to "flip" against Vernon Jordan, Betty Currie, and the President, and even to wear a body wire while
conversing with him.' 93 To secure Lewinsky's cooperation, the lawyers
189 POSNER, supra note 15, at 76.
190 Id.
19t TOOBIN, supra note 125, at 204.
192 MORTON, supra note 187, at 221, 223.
193 Id. See also TooBIN, supra note 125, at 204.
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for Judge Starr's Office threatened her with prison sentences for her al94
leged crimes totaling twenty-seven years.'
Let us deal first with the question raised by Judge Posner: did the
nearly ten to twelve-hour session that Lewinsky endured with law enforcement agents in room 1012 amount to coercion such that if she had
made inculpatory statements before being granted immunity, they would
have been inadmissible against her? This is a particularly timely question given the Supreme Court's recent decision to revisit the constitutional viability of the Miranda opinion. More important, the law
enforcement tactics employed by Staff's deputies in that room provide an
opportunity to probe the Court's cynical attitude toward what limits, if
any, should be placed on the ability of the police to secure a confession
from a criminal suspect. Furthermore, what transpired in "Room 1012"
gives us pause to consider the disdain the Court holds for the functional
and symbolic role played by criminal defense counsel in an adversary
system of adjudication.
1. Work on a Suspect, Lie to Her, Get a Confession; Even If the
Confession Is Suppressed, It Might Not Matter, Anyway.
By All Means, Keep Lawyers Out of the Process-Even
If You Have to Lie!
19 5
Imagine being in a room with as many as nine armed FBI agents
as well as three experienced federal prosecutors.196 To sway your decision in their favor, they lie, telling you that you face twenty-seven years
in prison if you do not cooperate with them in snaring the President of
the United States and his friends. At best, you might face twenty-seven
months in prison rather than twenty-seven years.' 97 Perhaps an FBI
agent, for effect, displays his jacket to show you his handcuffs when this
somber lie is being conveyed to you. 198 When you attempt to call your
lawyer, they rely on deception by claiming your lawyer specializes in
civil law and has no familiarity with the criminal process. 199 In fact,
your lawyer headed the Washington, D.C. public defender service for six
years. 2°° Raising the stakes, they threaten to prosecute your mother as an
added bonus. 20' To allay the inherent coercion of the encounter, they
permit you to leave the room after a few hours and roam the shopping
194 Id. at 220;

POSNER,

supra note 15, at 76.

195 MORTON, supra note 187, at 225.

196 Id. at 220-25; TOOBIN, supra note 125 at 204-06. The prosecutors who unsuccessfully
attempted to "flip" Lewinsky were Mike Emmick, Bruce Udolf, and Jackie Bennett.
197 POSNER, supra note 15, at 76.
198 MORTON, supra note, 187 at 223-25.
199 Id. at 223.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 225.
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mall to which the hotel is attached. 20 2 And, of course, you can call mom,
but not your attorney !203 Your attorney is contacted after business hours
by the same FBI agent who had conveniently displayed his handcuffs
when you were deceived into believing you had a twenty-seven year ex20 4
posure to criminal liability.
What is remarkable about Monica Lewinsky's ordeal is that she did
not break down and opt to accept immunity in exchange for turning government agent against the President and his associates. Nevertheless, we
should explore Judge Posner's query: had Lewinsky confessed to crimes
without either the benefit of immunity or counsel, would the confession
have withstood constitutional scrutiny?2 0 5 Even presuming the confession was coerced or the product of a violation of the right to counsel,
would it nonetheless have been admissible in a criminal prosecution?
More germane to our inquiry, what is the Supreme Court's view on deceiving the suspect as well as the role of counsel in improving the police's chances of securing a confession? These questions go to the heart
of an adversarial system of criminal adjudication. As such, they reveal
the Court's conception of that system and whether that philosophy
squares with the goals of the process.
The Supreme Court has long grappled with the fundamental question of what constitutes a coerced, or involuntary, confession. Focusing
on a multifactor analysis, the Court has concluded that either physical or
psychological coercion, or the threat of such coercion, renders a confes20 6
sion involuntary or coerced, because it "overbears" a suspect's will.
Although this approach might be deemed unsatisfactory because of its
indeterminate nature, it does raise the ultimate issue of determining when
the police cross the threshold from legitimate investigation to unsavory
torture.
Neither the FBI nor Starr's deputies attempted to physically "overbear" Lewinsky's will to resist confessing and becoming a governmental
agent. But from the deception about her potential criminal liability to the
machinations designed to prevent her from contacting her lawyer, the
FBI and Starr's deputies relied on mental pressure to achieve their ends.
The Supreme Court has emphatically noted that "coercion can be mental
as well as physical, and . ..the blood of the accused is not the only
202 Id. at 223.
203 Id. at 226.
204 Id. at 228-30.
205 See POSNER, supra note 15, at 76.
206 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Columbe V. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560

(1958).
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hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition. '20 7 We know with the benefit of hindsight that Lewinsky did not succumb to the pressure, which
testifies to her exceptional fortitude. It would have been natural to have
caved in to the pressure and relented to the Office of Independent Counsel's suasion. A related question is whether Lewinsky was in police
"custody" and subject to interrogation or its functional equivalent 20 8 such
as to trigger the now famous Miranda warnings.
Would the actions by Staff's deputies and FBI agents gathered in
room 1012 with a captive victim have amounted to coercion? Three factors are critical to determining whether Lewinsky's will would have been
overborne had she confessed and agreed to cooperate with Starr's investigation. First, the exaggeration, if not outright lie, concerning her potential prison sentence would have created significant psychological
pressure for her to confess. Indeed, Judge Posner believes "[t]his was the
most coercive aspect of the encounter." 20 9 Second, the Independent
Counsel sought to extract Lewinsky's cooperation by threatening to expose her mother to criminal punishment. Third, Staff's deputies strove to
circumvent Lewinsky's attempt to contact her lawyer through chicanery
and intimidation. Conceivably, these factors could in the aggregate have
worn down her resistance and "overborne" her will.
Before discussing the cases that support this conclusion, it is instructive to examine the reasons why two distinguished legal commentators do not agree with my assessment. Let us begin with Judge Posner,
since he raised the issue in his influential book. In his own words: "Had
[Lewinsky] made a self-incriminating statement and later been prosecuted, it is possible but unlikely that the statement would have been excluded from evidence as having been obtained by coercion. No such
thing happened, and these hardball tactics were at most what the law
calls harmless error. '210 Perhaps it is unfair to castigate Judge Posner for
making a conclusory statement without foundation in legal precedent.
After all, I presume Judge Posner was trying to reach a broader audience
than the legal community. As a jurist and member of the academy, however, one wishes he would have provided a measure of legal support for
207 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. at 206.

208 The warnings are mandated when the suspect is in custody or otherwise "deprived of

his freedom of action in any significant way," Miranda,384 U.S. at 444. See also Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (defining custody from an objective standard); and when he is
subject to interrogation or its functional equivalent as defined in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980) (interrogation involves express questioning "or any words or actions on the
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect").
209 POSNER, supra note 15, at 76 n.28.
210

Id. at 76.
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his conclusion. I will attempt to fill in the gaps in Judge Posner's analysis or, more aptly, his lack of analysis.
I believe Judge Posner's assessment reflects the musings of an elitist
jurist and academician whose instrumental and pragmatic perspective on
the criminal justice system animates his rationale. Paradoxically, while
he fails to justify his conclusion on why Lewinsky's confession would
have not been coerced, Judge Posner stresses the distinction between
"popular" and "legal" justice. 21 1 He takes academics, lawyers, and the
President's supporters in the impeachment drama to task for failing to
make that distinction. 21 2 Yet, he fails to explain why, if Lewinsky had
made self-incriminating statements, the government's tactics would not
have violated the Fifth Amendment. Judge Posner is, I suppose, the consummate elitist judge; the message he disseminates is consistent with a
judicial philosophy that views transgressions by law enforcement agents
as a mere stumbling block to the ultimate aim of apprehending criminals.
As he observes, "[t]he purpose of a criminal trial ... is to get at the truth
' 21 3
rather than to decide whether the prosecutors have been unsporting.
Jeffrey Toobin, on the other hand, wrote a book intended for a "popular" mass audience. Therefore, it is hard to fault him for not providing
legal support for his perspective that what transpired in "Room 1012"
was "entirely appropriate" given the status of Judge Starr's investigation. 21 4 As a former prosecutor and associate counsel in the Iran-Contra
Independent Counsel Investigation, however, Toobin naturally would see
nothing legally amiss with what occurred in "Room 1012." It is difficult
to imagine the other side of the coin when one's proclivity is to see the
criminal process from the vantage point of the prosecutor rather than
defense counsel.
Returning to the three variables that I stressed could have resulted in
a coerced confession had Lewinsky given prosecutors a "self-incriminating" statement in room 1012, I will now explore them in depth. Unaware
of what she would be confronting that day, thrust into a hotel room with
her betrayer and a host of FBI agents and seasoned prosecutors, and
falsely told she faced substantial criminal exposure, Lewinsky could
have concluded that she had no choice but to incriminate herself and
agree to cooperate.
Compare this scenario with the facts in Spano v. New York. 21 5 In
that case, a number of detectives and a skillful prosecutor interrogated a
211 Id. at 92. Judge Posner defines "popular" justice as the "ideas of justice that are held
by the average person untrained in the law." By contrast, he stresses that "legal" justice is the
"justice meted out by judges and other authorized officials." Id.
212 See id.
213 Id. at 83.
214 TOOBIN, supra note 125, at 204.
215 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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twenty-five year old man suspected of murder for nearly eight continuous hours. 2 16 Like Lewinsky, he had no criminal record, although he had
a grade-school education 2 17 and a history of emotional instability. 218
Spano repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested an attorney during the interrogation session.21 9 Finally, the police used a childhood friend, who
was a "fledgling" policeman, to elicit the defendant's sympathy and
220
thereby obtain a confession.
Notice the parallels between Spano, albeit with some differences,
and Lewinsky's dilemma in "Room 1012." She was twenty-three years
old when she had to deal with the FBI and Starr's deputies in room 1012.
True, she was not in a police station; but, after all, she had been unexpectedly confronted with her accuser, Linda Tripp, in that room as well
as numerous accusers. It is also true that she had a college education;
Spano had only a half-year in high school. But she was in the room with
the agents for almost the same amount of time. 22 1 She faced not just one
"skillful" prosecutor but three. 222 Surely, through the tapes and the debriefing of Linda Tripp, the Office of Independent Counsel should have
been aware of Lewinsky's fragile emotional state. Further, her biographer amply documents Lewinsky's emotional problems, culminating in
therapy and admission into an eating disorder clinic when she was thirteen. 223 Of course, those problems were exacerbated by her relationship
with the President.
Spano had also been betrayed by his friend's false importunings. It
is intriguing to note that the Supreme Court cited John Gay's famous
couplet in its opinion: "An open foe may prove a curse, But a pretended
friend is worse. '224 Lewinsky was betrayed by her best friend. It is true
that Spano knew he was being questioned about a murder. Lewinsky's
suspected crime may have been less ominous, but she was being confronted with a potential imprisonment of twenty-seven years or incriminating herself and ensnaring the President of the United States in a
criminal web. It is astonishing, once more, that her will was not overcome despite the unrelenting stress and pressure she endured in room
1012. Like Spano, moreover, Lewinsky was denied the opportunity to
id. at 317-19.
id. at 321-22.
id. at 322.
id. at 318-19, 322.
Id.at 318-19.
See MORTON, supra note 187, at 225. Morton observes that, "Eflor ten hours Monica
was alone with as many as nine armed FBI agents and Starr's deputies, hard-boiled characters
216
217
218
219
220
221

See
See
See
See

who normally hunt or prosecute those responsible for the most serious and brutal federal offenses." Id.
222 See id.
223 See id. at 34-35.
224 Spano, 360 U.S. at 323.
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call her attorney, Frank Carter, to deal with the awesome power representing the government in room 1012.
Despite these similarities, one could stress differences which would
distinguish Spano and point toward the voluntariness of Lewinsky's selfincriminating statements, had she decided to make inculpatory statements to Starr's deputies. First, Spano had a limited education. Second,
he suffered a cerebral concussion and was found unsuitable for military
service because of a "psychiatric" disorder. Spano, moreover, had been
indicted for a serious crime (murder) and instructed by his attorney not to
answer any questions by the police. Perhaps more telling would be the
fact that Lewinsky was allowed to leave the confines of room 1012, and
Spano was in a the custody of the police for the entire interrogation session. Whether these differences would have mattered in rendering a confession voluntary are debatable, but other factors at play in the Lewinsky
saga buttress the finding of coercion in her case as well.
Indeed, a salient factor contributing to a finding of coercion was the
threat to send Lewinsky's mother to prison if Lewinsky failed to cooperate. 225 When Starr deputy Jackie Bennett relied on this stratagem in

room 1012, we are reminded of a similar tactic the Court frowned upon
in Rogers v. Richmond.226 In that case, the police managed to obtain a
confession from the suspect only after threatening to arrest his wife, who
suffered from arthritis. 227 Further, the police denied the suspect's re228
quest at the beginning of the interrogation to consult with a lawyer.
Elucidating the principle that a confession is not voluntary merely because it is truthful, the Court instead stressed the notion that the method
by which the confession was obtained is central to the adversarial process of adjudication. 229 In effect, subtle psychological ploys designed to
break down a suspect's resistance offend the quintessential tenet "that
230
ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system.
Are the two situations comparable, or are they sufficiently dissimilar to arouse skepticism? Is threatening a suspect with criminal sanctions
for either a spouse or a mother qualitatively different? I don't think so.
What the law enforcement agents were attempting to accomplish in both
instances is indistinguishable: to exploit the deepest core of the suspect's
emotional vulnerability in order to obtain a confession. This is indeed
225 See MORTON, supra note 187, at 226. Prosecutor Jackie Bennett reputedly told Lewinsky: "You should know that we are going to prosecute your mother too, because of the things

you have said she has done. We have it all on tape." Id. See also POSNER, supra note 15, at
76.
226 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
227 See id. at 535-36.
228 See id. at 536-37.
229 See id. at 540-41.
230 Id. at 541.
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the "staple" of modem confession techniques. The police no longer rely
on physical punishment to break the suspect's will; rather they employ
"psychological persuasion and manipulation." 23 1 After all, if the goal
was to investigate potential criminal liability at the highest level of govemnment, no investigative stone should have been left unturned. From an
instrumental perspective, whatever psychological harm may have been
inflicted on Lewinsky paled in comparison to the possibility of uncovering crimes in the White House.
Had Lewinsky made incriminating statements that were the product
of coercion, those statements may nevertheless have been admissible.
Judge Posner is indeed correct in stating that coerced or involuntary confessions are subject to "harmless error" analysis. In Arizona v. Fulminante, a majority of the Court held that the admission of an involuntary
confession is a "classic trial error"-distinguishable from a "structural
error," which vitiates the fairness of a trial-and that the former type of
error may be "harmless. ' 232 Therefore, if the prosecution proved that the
introduction of such a confession at trial was "harmless" beyond a reasonable doubt, the admission of the confession would not require reversal of the conviction. 233 Given the confession's powerful weight,
however, it is difficult to predict whether the harmless error standard
would have been satisfied if Lewinsky had been prosecuted.
It is counterintuitive to contend that a confession secured through
police misconduct is merely a "trial error" subject to harmless error analysis. In effect, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote that portion of the
opinion in Fulminante, condones illegitimate law enforcement conduct
for the sake of efficiency. The most revealing aspect of his opinion is the
rationale furnished for this perplexing doctrine. The Chief Justice explains that since governmental violations of the Fourth and Sixth Amendments are subject to harmless error analysis, and may be "as
reprehensible as conduct that results in an involuntary confession," it follows that involuntary confessions should receive the same treatment. 234
Chief Justice Rehnquist further observes that Fourth and Sixth Amendment transgressions "can involve conduct as egregious as police conduct
used to elicit statements in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. '235
The final part of his syllogism concludes that "[i]t is thus impossible to
231 Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard A. Leo, The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, 11
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1964); Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979).
232 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991).

233 In Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court held that constitutional error
does not necessarily require the reversal of a conviction. Rather, the prosecution has the burden of establishing that the error was "harmless" beyond a reasonable doubt.
234 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 311-12.
235 Id. at 311.
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create a meaningful distinction between confessions elicited in violation
of the Sixth Amendment and those in violation of the Fourteenth
236
Amendment."
The message the Chief Justice conveys through this syllogism is
unmistakable: egregious police conduct should not obstruct the central
meaning of the criminal process-to get at the truth regardless of the
"egregious" methods employed by law enforcement in search of that elusive and contextual goal. Juxtaposing this tenet with the Rogers v. Richmond principle that the conduct of the police, rather than the "truth"
value of a confession, is the critical question in determining the voluntariness of a confession, produces an intriguing paradox. 237 How does the
Rehnquist Court reconcile the notion that coerced confessions are abhorrent to a democratic system of government and an adversarial criminal
justice system with the potential admission of such confessions in a criminal trial? More germane to our theme, doesn't the harmless error doctrine as applied to involuntary confessions provide a potential incentive
for police to extract coerced confessions from suspects in the hope that
the harmless error doctrine will possibly permit the confession to be
heard by the jury? At bottom, what the Rehnquist Court implicitly condones is "egregious" police conduct that violates essential adversarial
safeguards embedded in the Fifth Amendment.
2.

Would Miranda Have Helped Lewinsky?

A second legal avenue that Lewinsky could have invoked had she
confessed to Starr's deputies in room 1012 is the controversial Miranda238 doctrine. In order to prevail on a motion to suppress the confession, Lewinsky would have had to establish the twin predicates on which
Miranda rests: custody and interrogation. 239 Although the interrogation
prong might have been satisfied, it is questionable whether Lewinsky
could have convinced a trial court that she was in custody when she
faced the dilemma in room 1012. Had she surmounted that hurdle, she
would have succeeded where the vast majority of Mirandaclaimants fail:
she uttered the magic incantation that furnishes the only genuine protection under the doctrine, "I want an attorney. '2 40 Lurking behind these
236 Id.

at 311-12.

See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
238 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
239 Miranda is premised on the inherent coercion surrounding custodial interrogation. The
Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way." Id. at 444.
240 In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Court held that once the subject of
custodial interrogation expresses the desire not to be questioned without the presence of a
lawyer, he "is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges,
237
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issues are more fundamental questions concerning the behavior by law
enforcement that the Rehnquist Court has sanctioned in the process of
fundamentally altering the meaning and spirit of Miranda.
The key question is whether Lewinsky was in custody and interrogated in room 1012. The pillar supporting Miranda is the need to dispel
the police-dominated atmosphere of custodial interrogation. Therefore,
at the threshold, a suspect must establish that she was in custody at the
time law enforcement officers questioned her about a crime. A police
station, by definition, constitutes a forum in which the police exert control over a citizen. Nevertheless, such a venue does not automatically
convert a police-citizen encounter into custody for Miranda purposes.
Indeed, the Court has held that an individual who "voluntarily" went to a
police station to be questioned about a burglary was not in custody and
thus fell outside Miranda's protective umbrella. 241 But the fact that the
suspect who "voluntarily" went to the station in that case was on parole
casts doubt on the conclusion the majority reached. 242
Conversely, one would intuitively assume that a suspect who is
questioned in her home is not in a police-controlled venue. 243 Of course,
this inquiry is necessarily fact-specific, for if a police officer points a gun
at a suspect while questioning her at her home, the reasonable person
under the circumstances would feel she was in custody. 244 Straddling
these two extremes is the situation Lewinsky confronted: she faced her
accusers neither in the imposing confines of the police station nor in the
more familiar surroundings of her Watergate apartment. Was the atmosphere in room 1012 one in which a reasonable person under the circumstances would have felt her freedom of action was curtailed to a degree
associated with "custody?" It is apparent that Starr's deputies sought to
evade the strictures posed by Miranda in choosing a neutral site at which
they could seek Lewinsky's confession in exchange for the promise of
immunity. This stratagem was probably triggered by their knowledge
that Lewinsky had legal representation and would, as she ultimately did,
probably seek the services of her attorney before dealing with a cadre of
or conversations with the police." Id. at 484-85. This is the part of the opinion that "has
withstood dilution." See Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, supra note 87, at 491.

241 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
242 Id. at 500 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243 Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). However, in Orozco v. Texas, 394
U.S. 324 (1969), the Court held the defendant was in custody when four police officers entered
his bedroom at 4 a.m. and questioned him without administering the Miranda warnings.
244 In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), the Court adopted an objective approach to the question of custody. The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable person would
believe he was in custody. Id. at 442. Thus, a police officer's unarticulated beliefs "are relevant only to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her 'freedom of action.' Stansbury
v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325.
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experienced FBI agents and prosecutors. To bolster the case against Miranda warnings, the investigators made sure they could contend that she
was free to leave the hotel room at any time during the process.
In fact, it was after two hours had elapsed with her pursuers in room
1012 that Lewinsky succeeded in leaving, as prosecutor Emmick "reluctantly allowed Monica to leave the room" and make a call from a pay
phone to her mother. 245 From the standpoint of the contending parties, it
is easy to argue that either Lewinsky was in custody or she was free to
leave at any time during her unexpected encounter with law enforcement
agents and Starr's deputies. The relevant inquiry, however, is whether a
reasonable person in the suspect's position would have believed she was
in custody. 2 46 Further, the law enforcement agent's "unarticulated plan"
bears no relation to the question of custody. 247 Would a trial court employing this objective standard have found that Lewinsky was in custody
for those two hours before she ultimately left room 1012 in order to contact her mother? Let us examine the issue with the benefit of hindsight.
A reasonable person unwittingly confronted with a host of law enforcement agents bent upon securing her cooperation against powerful
individuals, including the President of the United States, would find it
difficult to imagine she could merely walk away, even from a hotel
room. This feeling was probably accentuated by the threat of substantial
prison time leveled at Lewinsky not by police officers, but rather by experienced prosecutors. She was, moreover, "escorted" to room 1012 by
two FBI agents, 248 hardly a comforting factor leading the reasonable person to conclude she was free to leave the room at any time. Couple those
factors with the attempt by prosecutors to dissuade her from contacting
her lawyer, and you have a situation in which the reasonable suspect
would feel her freedom of action was severely circumscribed. Perhaps
Lewinsky's perception was not objectively far-fetched: "I still have
249
nightmares about it ... the sense of being trapped and drowning."

For practical purposes, though the encounter may have occurred in
the antiseptic confines of a hotel room, it was nevertheless permeated
with the aura of a police-dominated atmosphere. I seriously doubt that
most people, other than professional hit men, when faced with such an
awesome display of governmental power, would immediately tell the inquisitors to take a hike. 250 The options available to Lewinsky in the ho245

MORTON,

supra note 187, at 226-27; TooBiN, supra note 125, at 205.

246 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 442.
247 Id.

248

MORTON,

supra note 187, at 219; TOOBIN, supra note 125, at 203.

249 MORTON, supra note 187, at 225.

250 I use this example to illustrate how difficult it is for any individual to resist a law
enforcement dominated situation. David Simon has documented the Baltimore Homicide Department's inability to secure a confession only in the instances of two professional hit men
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tel room were stark: turn against Jordan, Currie, and the President;
contact her attorney for legal advice; or attempt somehow to escape the
investigators by convincing them that she would not cave in to their demands without some preliminary concessions-at the very least, being
allowed to call her mother. The last option is what she chose to do, only
after two grueling hours of exchanges with the prosecutors and federal
law enforcement agents. Lewinsky, moreover, was effectively precluded
from exercising the second alternative: calling her lawyer for assistance.
Obviously, that option would have foiled the government's objective to
flip Lewinsky against the "bigger fish."
The most compelling evidence, however, that Lewinsky was "in
custody" for Mirandapurposes, seems to lie in the prosecutors' exaggerated and deceitful contention that she faced considerable prison time for
her deeds. Would a reasonable person who was unexpectedly escorted to
a hotel room filled with law enforcement agents, confronted with potential exposure to twenty-seven years in prison, and given the option to
avoid the onerous penalties by providing evidence against the President,
feel her freedom of action was not significantly abridged? Did she somehow feel, after her betrayer Linda Tripp was in the room with her, that
Ken Starr's deputies, together with the two FBI agents who escorted her
to the room, would let her escape without any adverse consequences? A
layperson with even a modicum of common sense would believe that law
enforcement agents with sufficient evidence to charge a suspect with serious crimes are not going to let her slip gently into the night.
Two cases potentially militate against the finding that Lewinsky
was in custody when she faced her accusers in room 1012. In Oregon v.
Mathiason,2 5 1 the Court held that a burglary suspect who voluntarily
went to a police station and was interviewed regarding the crime was not
"in custody. '252 The suspect not only went to the station of his own
volition but also was immediately informed he was not under arrest and
2 53
was allowed to depart the station a half-hour after the interview began.
Indeed, the majority stressed these three factors in determining that
254
Mathiason was not in custody.
Similarly, the Court held that a suspect was not in custody even
2 55
though he was questioned at a police station in California v. Beheler.
Again, the majority emphasized Beheler's voluntary trip to the stawho immediately invoked their right not to be interrogated without an attorney when brought
into police headquarters for questioning. DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING
STREETS 210 (1991).
251 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
252 Id. at 495.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
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tionhouse, the police disclosure that he was not under arrest, and the
short duration of the interview (less than thirty minutes). 256 At bottom,
what these two cases reflect is a policy judgment that stationhouse questioning is not necessarily custodial. Rejecting the lower court's conclusion that Mathiason was questioned in a "coercive environment," the
majority concluded that warnings are not mandated at the stationhouse
because "[a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer
will have coercive aspects to it."257 Rather, the critical inquiry in assessing whether the Miranda warnings must be administered is whether the
suspect's freedom has been curtailed so "as to render him 'in
custody.' "258
More importantly, deception designed to induce the suspect to confess is irrelevant to the issue of custody. In Mathiason, the law enforcement agent falsely informed the suspect that investigators had discovered
his fingerprints at the scene of the burglary.2 5 9 The Court emphatically
observed that this fact had "nothing to do with whether [the suspect] was
in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule.''26° Of course, it is disingenuous to maintain that a suspect who is falsely told by the police that
they possess incontrovertible proof of her commission of a crime will
feel she is perfectly free to leave the stationhouse without adverse legal
effects.
Finally, Justice Marshall's prescient doubt has come to fruition. In
his Mathiason dissent, he wondered whether the decision would "suggest
that police officers can circumvent Miranda by deliberately postponing
the official 'arrest' and the giving of Miranda warnings until the necessary incriminating statements have been obtained." 26 1 Indeed, the practice has become institutionalized among the police, as reflected in the
term "to Beheler" a suspect. 262 Coupled with the notion that deception
plays no role in determining whether a suspect is in custody, the precept
that stationhouse questioning does not necessarily translate into custody
underscores the legal charade that the Court has fostered in construing
the scope of Miranda.
Do Mathiason and Beheler conclusively demonstrate that Lewinsky
was not "in custody" when she was whisked to room 1012 by FBI agents
and implored by Starr's deputies to turn government agent? The Court
has noted that such an inquiry is fact-specific, to be determined by as256 Id. at 1122.
257 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495.

258

Id.

See id. at 493.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 499 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
EmpiricalStudy of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. Rav. 839, 881 (1996).
259
260
261
262
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sessing the "totality of the circumstances. '26 3 It is incumbent upon us to
weigh the facts in the Lewinsky saga to determine whether my conclusion that she was in custody is viable.
The first variable we must consider is the place where the encounter
took place. In this respect, Lewinsky's venue was less "coercive" than
Mathiason's or Beheler's. Lewinsky was interviewed in a hotel room
rather than in the traditionally "police dominated" atmosphere of the stationhouse. Whether she voluntarily accompanied the two FBI agents
who "escorted" her to room 1012 is debatable. Mathiason went to the
station without a police escort. 264 Although Beheler presumably did go
with police to the station, he was told before accompanying the police
that he was not under arrest. 265 I suppose one could argue that Lewinsky

was in a public place and could have politely declined the invitation to
accompany the agents. But at any rate, since Lewinsky came close to
being ambushed and had no inkling she was about to be confronted by
FBI agents, it is possible to distinguish her situation from Mathiason's
and Beheler's, both of whom knew exactly what the police were up to
when they decided to go to the stationhouse.
Furthermore, Lewinsky was presumably never told she was not
under arrest during the two hours she dealt with Starr's deputies'in Room
1012. Nor, for that matter, was the interview "short," lasting thirty minutes or less. Rather, the prosecutors labored intensely for two hours to
convince Lewinsky that she faced grave criminal punishment, and that
her only viable alternative was to cooperate with them. If we believe her
account, moreover, that one of the FBI agents actually asked her whether
his gun made her feel uncomfortable, it strains credulity to conclude that
a reasonable person in her circumstances would have felt free to leave
the room. Finally, the number and experience of her interrogators rendered Lewinsky more vulnerable than Mathiason, who only faced one
detective, not a team of prosecutors and FBI agents.
My assessment that the false statement about her potential criminal
exposure justifies the conclusion that Lewinsky was in custody is belied
by Mathiason's holding. Because deception is irrelevant to the issue of
custody, the false statement by Starr's deputies has no bearing on
whether Lewinsky was in custody for Miranda purposes. Notice the paradox behind this legal fiction. Had she confessed, Lewinsky would have
been on more solid legal ground in arguing that the false statements
about her criminal exposure contributed to a coerced confession. But if
she was not in custody, and the false statements by police are irrelevant,
Lewinsky would not have been able to establish a Mirandaviolation. As
263 California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (1983).
264 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493.
265 463 U.S. at 1122.
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I have argued, this paradox shows that Miranda, which was supposed to
provide more protections to suspects than the old "voluntariness" stan2 66
dard, actually furnishes fewer safeguards.
Let us assume, however, that Lewinsky was in custody at the time
Starr's deputies sought to obtain her assistance against the President and
his friend and subordinates. Further, let us assume that she did not utter
the magic Miranda incantation: I want my lawyer's assistance to deal
with your experienced prosecutors and federal law enforcement agents.
Finally, let us presume that she was interrogated under Miranda's criteria
for coerced confessions: that is, law enforcement agents expressly questioned her or used words or actions they should have known would have
elicited incriminating responses. 267 It is obvious, parenthetically, that
Lewinsky was interrogated for Miranda purposes in room 1012. The
prosecutors sought to elicit her concession that she had violated the law
and would be willing to turn government agent in exchange for immunity. Had Lewinsky confessed, she would have had to overcome the
custody hurdle, rather than the interrogation obstacle, in staking out a
successful Miranda claim.
Under the foregoing assumptions, the question emerges whether deception by Starr's associates would have been legally relevant. For example, suspend disbelief once more and pretend that Frank Carter,
Lewinsky's counsel, had received a tip that the prosecutors were attempting to debrief her at the Arlington, Virginia Ritz-Carlton Hotel. He
promptly called Starr's office but was assured that such was not the case.
Rather simply, Starr's Office lied to Carter about their attempt to obtain
Lewinsky's incriminating admission and to "flip" her against Vernon
Jordan, Betty Currie, and the President. Would this flagrant lie have had
legal ramifications had Lewinsky acceded to the Independent Counsel's
wishes? The stark, yet simple, answer to this query according to the
Miranda doctrine is: no.
In Moran v. Burbine,268 a majority of the Court held that police
deception of an attorney and the failure of the police to inform a suspect
of his attorney's effort to reach him did not adversely affect his waiver of
the Miranda rights. 269 Upholding Burbine's waiver of his Miranda protections, the majority concluded that as long as the suspect's decision is
"uncoerced" and he knows he may remain silent and that any statements
could be used to his detriment, "the analysis is complete and the waiver
266 See Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, supra note 87.
267 This is the standard to determine whether the police have interrogated a suspect set
forth by the Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
268 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
269 Id. at 422-23.
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is valid as a matter of law."' 270 This tenet is consistent with the Court's

judgment that police deception of the suspect is not germane to the question whether the suspect is in "custody. "27

It would be strange for the Court to deny that such information
might be useful to a suspect. After all, any suspect who was about to be
interrogated would likely reevaluate the decision to confess if told that
her attorney had attempted to reach her. The Burbine majority acknowledged the obvious when it recognized that such information "would be
2 72
useful" to a suspect and might even "affect" her decision to confess.
Nevertheless, the majority ignored this truism by stressing that the Court
has "never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in
'273
deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.
The ethos perpetuated by the Court's facile sleight-of-hand is one
"that exalts incommunicado communication, sanctions police deception,
and demeans the right to consult with an attorney. '274 Indeed, the prosecutors or law enforcement agents who are familiar with the Court's Miranda jurisprudence have embraced this "ethic." In effect, Starr's
deputies knew that they could "Beheler" Lewinsky in the hope that she
would "flip" against the President. She would not be in "custody" and
they would dissuade her from asking for an attorney if she attempted to
invoke that remedy. They were well aware that neither deception about
her criminal exposure nor prevarication regarding what assistance her
attorney could lend her would be legally relevant. Why blame Starr's
deputies for relying on tactics the United States Supreme Court has explicitly condoned? The message of the Court is clear: lying to criminal
suspects in order to get them to confess and thereby arrive at the "truth"
is a worthy objective in an adversarial criminal justice system.
What an exquisite irony lies behind the Court's instrumental philosophy. Forgotten in this noble experiment are the values conveyed by
Court opinions to those in the field. Starr's associates and the FBI agents
who participated in the Lewinsky gambit in room 1012 took their cue
from the highest Court in the land. To the extent that members of the
American public may have disagreed with Ken Starr's tactics, they
should not have directed their dismay at his office; the blame instead lies
squarely with a Court blithely ignorant of the consequences of its intellectually elegant opinions. "War is hell," and because the war against
270 Id.

271 See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
272 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422.
273 Id. (citations omitted).
274 Id. at 441 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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criminals must be won, it is imperative to give the police the "upper
hand," even if the criminals do not seem ominous, like Lewinsky.
3.

Forget About the "Right to Counsel" Because It Had Not
"Attached"

Beyond the self-incrimination implications of the encounter in room
1012 lies the broader, yet more fundamental, right of a criminal defendant to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Lewinsky had retained able
counsel to represent her in the civil case brought against the President by
Paula Jones. Naturally, her first instinct when she was confronted by her
accusers in room 1012 was to invoke the aid of her retained counsel.
However wary the American public may be toward constitutional rights
protecting criminal defendants, they certainly view the right to counsel as
a necessity rather than a luxury. This commonsense notion has been embodied in Supreme Court opinions such as Gideon v. Wainright275 and
Argensigerv. Hamlin,276 both of which acknowledge the essential role of
lawyers in preserving the fundamental rights accorded criminal defendants in the Constitution.
But however fundamental the right to counsel may be, it does not
operate until the government has committed itself to formal prosecution
of the defendant.2 77 Formal prosecution begins when the government
files a formal charge, information, or indictment against the defendant;
or, alternatively, when the defendant is arraigned or faces a preliminary
hearing on the charges. 278 None of these triggering events had come
even close to fruition when Lewinsky confronted representatives from
the OIC and FBI agents in room 1012. From the perspective of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, which safeguards defendants once adversary proceedings have begun, Lewinsky in effect was entitled to none of
the benefits her counsel, Frank Carter, could have provided at that critical time. For the attorney-client relationship does not, by itself, "trigger"
279
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Given the powerful role confessions play in an adversary system,
one could argue that they serve "to seal a suspect's fate, '2 80 in effect
rendering the proceedings meaningless. In this context, the attorney-cli275 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
276 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
277 The Court has held that the right to counsel attaches at the initiation of "adversary

judicial criminal proceedings," "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information or arraignment." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); see also United
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400-01

(1977).
278 See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
279 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 431, citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 and
n.16 (1985).
280 This unsuccessful argument was raised by the respondent in Moran, 475 U.S. at 431.
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ent relationship reaches its "zenith" and becomes vital to the suspect.
Nevertheless, while recognizing such an obvious principle, and acknowledging that a confession will make the case at trial more difficult for the
defense attorney, the Court rejects the notion that a suspect should be
entitled to the assistance of counsel absent adversary proceedings. 28 1 No
doubt, the seasoned prosecutors representing the OIC were aware of this
crucial doctrine when they snared Lewinsky into the confines of room
1012.
Consistent with Miranda's anemic punch, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel furnishes scant aid to criminal suspects facing Lewinsky's predicament. And, as Burbine teaches prosecutors in the shoes of
Starr's subordinates, it is perfectly legal to dissuade a suspect from contacting a lawyer when the suspect is neither in "custody" nor entitled to
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Had Lewinsky confessed to her
interrogators, she would have not been able to suppress those incriminating statements on either Miranda or Sixth Amendment grounds; the lies,
deceptions or intimidation of the law enforcement agents were legally
irrelevant, thanks to the Rehnquist Court's ethically bankrupt, instrumental jurisprudence.
Even if a violation of the right to counsel occurs, the Rehnquist
Court has held that statements taken in such a context may be admissible
for impeachment purposes. 282 Relying on language used to circumscribe
Miranda's scope, the Rehnquist Court has conflated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel with Miranda, bestowing upon both of these the
pejorative sobriquet, "prophylactic rules. '2 83 Rather than treating the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a fundamental right, the Rehnquist
Court has instead opted to render it a mere "revocable privilege. '284
Why, then, we may rhetorically ask, should Starr's deputies have treated
Lewinsky's plaintive cries for her attorney with anything other than contempt? An adversary who is given a potent weapon with which to vanquish his opponent should not be faulted for relying on it, especially
when the stakes are high. The remarkable facet to the Lewinsky saga
was that she managed to "win" the skirmish despite her opponents' natural and strategic advantages.

281 See id. at 431-32.
282 Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990).
283 Id. at 353 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Meredith B. Halama, Loss of a Fundamental Right: The Sixth Amendment as a Mere 'Prophylactic Rule', 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 1207
(1999).
284 Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered
Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 39 (1991).
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THE GRAND JURY: WHOSE JURY IS IT?

Lewinsky might have won the skirmish but she lost the war when
she secured immunity from the Office of the Independent Counsel. At
that point, Ken Starr had at his disposal the most potent weapon afforded
a federal prosecutor: a grand jury to do his bidding. No institution is
more submissive to the will of a prosecutor literally pulling its strings. It
is not surprising, therefore, that the grand jury "became the focal point of
'285
the heavily criticized investigation of the President's conduct.
Neither Ken Starr nor his subordinates are to blame for the abhorrent
tactics employed, however unjustified they may have been in the eyes of
a good portion of the American public. Rather, the untrammeled discretion and control, virtually without any judicial oversight, given to prosecutors by the Rehnquist Court gave Starr wide latitude to manipulate the
grand jury process. In the final analysis, as one commentator has observed, "[t]he grand jury investigation led by the Independent Counsel
did not violate the constitutional rights of any witnesses, even if the tactics appeared high-handed and the reason for the inquiry politically
28 6
motivated."
Rather than emphasizing Starr's tactics, historians ought instead to
examine how the Supreme Court has transformed the traditional role and
function of the grand jury. Further, those with a more discerning view
should recognize that the Independent Counsel's use of the grand jury as
his personal fiefdom reflects the erosion of the institution's independence. Whether we explore the manner in which grand jury witnesses
were handled or mishandled, or the leaks from grand jury proceedings
emanating from Starr's Office, we should juxtapose those actions with
Supreme Court precedents that allow prosecutors not only to violate
grand jury rules with impunity 287 but also to withhold exculpatory evidence from it.288 In the war waged by the Independent Counsel against
the most powerful figure in the United States, the nuclear arsenal calculated to neutralize the President's power rested in the grand jury. No
wonder Ken Starr employed this mechanism with a vengeance. The grueling interrogation session the President endured in front of a camera,
broadcast throughout the world, symbolized the extent to which the
grand jury became the primal instrument designed to secure the President's impeachment.
285 Peter J. Henning, ProsecutorialMisconduct in Grand Jury Investigations, 51 S.C. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1999).
286 Id.
287 See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (holding that

errors in grand jury proceedings do not warrant dismissal of an indictment unless the defendant
can establish prejudice); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1984) (holding that grand

jury violations of Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d) are moot if a petit jury returns a guilty verdict).
288 United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
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THE GRAND JURY: FRIEND OR FOE?

Just as Lewinsky was helpless in room 1012 when confronting the
Independent Counsel, she was literally subservient to the government
once she struck the deal for immunity in exchange for her testimony.
That is my point in noting that she may have won the skirmish but lost
the war. Subject to the dictates of Starr's grand jury, Lewinsky would
eventually have to endure the indignity of her mother being subjected to
relentless questioning in front of a body of citizens that comprised Starr's
grand jury. More than any other facet of the investigation, the image of
Marcia Lewis, Lewinsky's mother, being reduced to tears inside the
grand jury room, precipitated a public outcry against Ken Starr's investigation. 2 89 Criticizing the Independent Counsel's foray, one legal observer decried the "aggressive and disproportionate tactics" which "left
the public with the justifiable perception that Mr. Starr is conducting a
'290
crusade rather than an investigation.
Nothing confirms this opinion in a more sardonic fashion than the
incident that triggered Marcia Lewis's breakdown in front of the grand
jury. The inanity of the questions that led to this pathos is redolent of the
potential for abuse of a witness by prosecutors controlling the process.
The line of questions revolved around the nickname Lewinsky had purportedly given Hillary Clinton in her conversations with Linda Tripp.
An exchange occurred in which two of Starr's prosecutors quizzed Lewis
on the etymology of the word "Babba," Mrs. Clinton's alleged nickname. 29 1 It is difficult to fathom how this issue was in any conceivable
way relevant to Starr's investigation. 292 The grand jurors, using their
common sense, must have been wondering how this information fit into
the investigation's puzzle. Rather simply, it did not. But when overzealous prosecutors have the rapt attention of citizens who depend on agents
of the government to present information, the "grand" jurors must endure
trivia with aplomb and patience.
How could the Independent Counsel treat witnesses with cavalier
disregard of their basic dignity and humanity without the threat of sanctions? I am sure that is a question the American people have pondered.
289 See, e.g., Editorial, Calling Mother to Testify an Invasion of Privacy, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 25, 1998, at Eli; Editorial, Pushing the Envelope: Starr's Zeal May Undercut
His Public Support, NEWSDAY, Feb. 15, 1998, at B1; Myriam Marquez, Editorial, How Would
You Feel If Your DaughterGot Stuck in Starr's Web?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 23, 1998, at
A10.
290 Richard Ben-Veniste, Comparisons Can be Odious, Mr. Starr, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21,
1998, at 21.
291 TOOBIN, supra note 125, at 282-83.

292 The Federal Rules of Evidence are not applicable to a grand jury proceeding. FED. R.
EviD. 110 1(d)(2). Therefore, the irrelevance of this line of questioning to the proceeding does
not constrain the prosecutor.
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But when one delves into whether any significant legal checks and balances exist for a prosecutor who controls the evidence presented to a
grand jury, the answer is stark and negative. In fact, the rough treatment
accorded Lewis by the Independent Counsel pales in comparison with
the behavior the Rehnquist Court has glossed over. It is instructive,
therefore, to examine this precedent to determine whether a "runaway"
federal prosecutor with a grand jury at his disposal may either be
stopped, or, at least, "slowed down."
B.

PROSECUTORS AND THE GRAND JURY: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Hailed as a bulwark against oppression 293 and firmly entrenched in
our historical and constitutional landscape, the grand jury has become the
prosecutor's dream. As one astute scholar has observed, "[a]lthough the
purpose of the grand jury is to protect those accused of crimes, few defendants take comfort from its presence; indeed, the staunchest defenders
of the institution are prosecutors. ' 294 This reality contradicts the primary
function of the grand jury to "[protect] citizens against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action." 29 5 It is ironic that the Court clings to the

legal fiction that the federal grand jury still fulfills its original mission.
Inquiring into the possible motivations of the Independent Counsel's use or misuse of the grand jury is a speculative enterprise. Instead
of dwelling on this futile exercise, it is more fruitful to determine
whether any significant legal restraints exist which might deter
prosecutorial misconduct within the grand jury. The answer to this question reveals the naked power wielded by the federal prosecutor. This
legal riddle, in turn, explains the bold actions taken by the Office of
Independent Counsel in the Clinton-Lewinsky affair. To a great extent,
the lack of legal constraints upon prosecutorial misconduct underscores
the futility of President Clinton's attempt to have the Office of Independent Counsel held in contempt for leaking grand jury matters to The New
296
York Times.
Imagine the following scenario: federal prosecutors committed several violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governing the
presentation of evidence to a grand jury. Specifically, the prosecutors
"manipulated the grand jury investigation to gather evidence for use in
civil audits; violated the secrecy provisions of [Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure] 6(e) by publicly identifying the targets and the subject matter
293 See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
294 Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (And Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 260, 261 (1995).
295 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
296 See In re: Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dismissing Rule
6(e) contempt proceedings against the Office of Independent Counsel and dismissing President
Clinton's alternative request for a stay).
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of the grand jury investigation; and imposed secrecy obligations in violation of Rule 6(e) upon grand jury witnesses. '2 97 In addition, the prosecutors administered unauthorized "oaths" to Internal Revenue Service
agents; deliberately had those agents misrepresent evidence to the grand
jury; and "deliberately berated and mistreated an expert for the defense
in the presence of some grand jurors. ' 298 Indeed, the government "conceded" that it was abusive to the witness both during a recess as well as
299
in front of the grand jury.

To an untrained, detached observer, this behavior by the prosecutors
would seem to reek of unfairness and would call for sanctions. Not so,
according to the Rehnquist Court. Relying on the notion that the supervisory power of a federal district court is limited, the Bank of Nova Scotia Court held that a district court may only dismiss an indictment based
upon such errors if they prejudiced the defendants. 300 In effect, a convic-

tion remedies any prosecutorial misconduct, however flagrant, rendering
such conduct "harmless." The only remedy left for a knowing violation
of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure relating to the grand jury function is a possible contempt proceeding against the prosecutor. 30 1 As Professor Henning has noted, "Itihe Court's approach to the prosecutor's
actions in grand jury investigations has effectively made that conduct
30 2
unreviewable by lower courts.
A more extreme version of such a hands-off approach to
prosecutorial control over the grand jury is exemplified in United States
v. Williams.30 3 In that case, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held
that the prosecutor has no "binding obligation" to present substantial exculpatory evidence to a grand jury; and correspondingly, that the lower
federal courts have "no authority to prescribe such a duty" pursuant to
their inherent supervisory power.3°4 Grounded in a separation of powers
rationale, Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority justifies its conclusion
297 Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 259 (1988).
298 Id. at 260-61.
299 Id. at 261.
300 See id. at 254. The Court relied heavily on United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499,
505-06 (1983) (holding that supervisory power ought not to be exercised to reverse a conviction if the error is harmless); and United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986). The Nova
Scotia court adopted the standard set forth in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Mechanik that dismissal of the indictment is not warranted unless the violation "substantially
influenced the grand jury's decision to indict" or created "grave doubt" that the decision to
indict was not tainted by such violations. 487 U.S. at 256 (citing United States v. Mechanik,
475 U.S. at 78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
301 See id. at 263.
302 Henning, supra note 285, at 8.
303 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
304 Id. at 53-55.
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on the functional independence of the grand jury from the judicial
305
branch.
The flaw underlying Justice Scalia's rationale is the assumption that
"the Fifth Amendment's constitutional guarantee presupposes an investigative body 'acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or
judge.' "306 It is amusing that Justice Scalia chooses to emphasize the
word "presupposes." One wonders whether he did this with sarcasm. If
he had read any literature on the true workings of the modern federal
grand jury, he could not have been serious. As the facts of Nova Scotia
demonstrate, the prosecutor enjoys unfettered control over the grand
jury, free from the scrutiny of a legal adversary, a judge or, for that matter, the public. 30 7 The notion that the modern grand jury is truly independent from prosecutorial control or manipulation defies context as well as
reality.
Given the Rehnquist Court's doctrine barring meaningful judicial
review of prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury, it followed that
the President's attempt to have the Office of Independent Counsel declared in contempt for leaks of grand jury material to the press would
fail. 30 8 In the ultimate political duel, the prosecutors had a trump card in
the game of spin control for the hearts and minds of the American public:
virtual immunity from judicial oversight of their actions relative to the
grand jury investigating the President's conduct. The appellate opinion
rejecting the President's stratagem is both ironic and illuminating. It is
ironic because the Counselor to the Independent Counsel lied about what
he disclosed to the press; it is illuminating to the extent it demonstrates
both the power and impunity bestowed upon federal prosecutors through
the Rehnquist Court's "Alice-in-Wonderland" perception of how grand
juries truly operate. Let us examine the proposition that the Office of
Independent Counsel violated neither the rules of criminal procedure
governing grand jury proceedings nor the rights of any witnesses.
During the course of President Clinton's impeachment trial in the
Senate, The New York Times published an article stating that prosecutors
within the Office of Independent Counsel were considering seeking a
grand jury indictment against the President upon the conclusion of the
Senate trial. 30 9 Among the charges the prosecutors were pondering, according to the article, were perjury in Clinton's Paula Jones deposition as
well as in his grand jury testimony. 3 10 Immediately after publication of
305 See id. at 47-50.
306 Id. at 49 (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1973)) (emphases in
original).
307 See id. at 62-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
308 See In re: Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
309 Id. at 997 (quoting relevant parts of the Times article).
310 Id.
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the article, Clinton and the Office of the President filed a motion to show
cause why the OIC should not be held in contempt for violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), 3 1' which prohibits federal prosecutors from divulging "matters occurring before the grand jury. ' 3 12
In response to this motion, the OIC submitted a statement by Starr's
Counselor, Charles G. Bakaly, III, asserting that he told The New York
Times reporter who wrote the article that he refused to confirm what
either Starr or the OIC "was thinking or doing." 31 3 Eventually, the OIC
"abandoned the argument" that it was not the source of the information
for The New York Times article, "took administrative action" against
Bakaly, and requested that the Department of Justice conduct a criminal
investigation of the issue. 31 4 Ultimately, the district court concluded that
the disclosure of the potential indictment of Clinton upon the conclusion
of the impeachment trial "revealed grand jury material and constituted a
3 15
prima facie violation of Rule 6(e)."
Reversing the district court's finding, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the disclosures
made by Bakaly to The New York Times did not constitute a prima facie
violation of Rule 6(e). 3 16 The court based its ruling on two fundamental
components: (1) the revelations by Bakaly did not involve "matters occurring before the grand jury"; and (2) the disclosure that Clinton was a
witness before the grand jury technically violated Rule 6(e), but the error
was harmless since the whole nation knew Clinton had testified before
the grand jury and he had told the American public about it in a nation3 17
ally televised address.
The appellate court had solid reasons for its holding. The disclosures by Bakaly were not "matters" that were before the grand jury.
Rather, they represented possible future actions the OIC might undertake
upon the conclusion of the impeachment trial. Although the court had
acknowledged in previous holdings that Rule 6(e) encompassed "matters
likely to occur" before the grand jury, it concluded that "[w]here the
reported deliberations do not reveal that an indictment has been sought
or will be sought," they do not fall within the strict parameters of the
rule. 318 Of course, one had to be on the moon not to know at the time the
311 Id.
312 In pertinent part, the rule states: " An attorney for the government ... shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided in these rules ......
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
313 Id.
314 Id.

315
316
317
318

Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id. at

997-98.
1001.
1001-05.
1003-04 (emphases in original).
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article was written that " a grand jury was investigating alleged perjury
and obstruction of justice by the President." 319 Left with no effective
remedy, the court noted the "troubling" nature of such disclosures, especially since they could potentially damage an innocent suspect's
320
reputation.
Therein lies the conundrum generated by the Court's approach to
judicial review of a federal prosecutor's misconduct before the grand
jury. As Justice Marshall presciently observed in his Bank of Nova Scotia dissent, the Court's path has relegated Rule 6 "to little more than a
code of honor that prosecutors can violate with virtual impunity. ' 32 1 Let
us assume that the revelation of the possible indictment of the President
or the disclosure that he was a witness would have constituted a "prima
facie" violation of Rule 6(e). Let us further presume that Starr's successor would have sought and obtained an indictment against Clinton, after
he leaves the Office of the Presidency, for perjury and obstruction of
justice. Finally, let us assume that Clinton would have been convicted of
either one or both counts. What would be the legal ramifications of the
violations of Rule 6(e) by the Office of the Independent Counsel?
As we have seen, both the Bank of Nova Scotia and Mechanik opinions would render such error "harmless." Justice Marshall, therefore,
was correct in surmising that these opinions rendered Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6, the only mechanism for regulating a federal prosecutor's conduct in front of a grand jury, "toothless." A result-oriented
jurisprudence that justifies the prosecution's misconduct as long as the
end of the game is a conviction goes a long way toward fostering an
attitude of invincibility. This leitmotif gives us a glimpse into Bakaly's
arrogance in misleading the court as to what he divulged to the press.
And, while Bakaly's deception did not occur "under oath," it certainly
besmirched the Office he represented by displaying the same behavior it
was seeking to deter by recommending the President's impeachment and
possible indictment.
As for Lewis's degrading treatment before the grand jury, the
American public was not aware that the Supreme Court had in effect
condoned such conduct in one of its decisions. In the Bank of Nova
Scotia opinion, the prosecutors admitted to "berating" and "mistreating"
an expert witness both in front of the grand jury as well as during a
recess from the deliberations. 322 But as long as such behavior does not
"substantially influence" the grand jury's decision to indict the defen319 Id. at 1005.
320 Id. at 1003-04. The OIC had also regretted the disclosures, stating that they revealed
"sensitive and confidential internal OIC information." Id. at 997,
321 Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 265 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
322 Id. at 260-61.
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dant, it is legally irrelevant. 323 How could such inane and irrelevant
questions put to Lewis by Starr's subordinates have "substantially influenced" its decision to indict? The reader may readily glean the answer to
my rhetorical question. One could hardly fault the American public,
moreover, for being ignorant of Supreme Court precedent allowing such
distasteful actions. In the political arena in which the investigation was
being waged, the OIC's mistreatment of Marcia Lewis backfired against
Starr. Had it not been a "high profile" political case, however, the prosecutor's misconduct would have been, most likely, legally irrelevant and
ignored.
In effect, the grand jury investigation by the OIC vividly illustrates
what the Rehnquist Court has wrought: the elimination of judicial review
of prosecutorial misconduct during grand jury investigations. 324 It is true
that the Rehnquist Court has merely ratified a course the Supreme Court
has consistently and slavishly adhered to. A major rationale proffered
for such a rigid stance is that "seeking judicial review of the grand jury
investigation can devolve into a tactic to delay the prosecution of valid
criminal charges. '325 Rather than regulating the prosecutor's conduct
during the grand jury's investigation, the alternative seems to lie in two
statutes designed to provide the aggrieved parties redress and to sanction
the prosecutors after the fact through application of ethical rules governing an attorney's conduct. These two statutes are the Hyde Amend327
ment32 6 and the McDade Act.
Both laws emerged from Congressional ire over the prosecution of
one of their own members, Robert McDade, who was acquitted of federal criminal charges involving campaign contributions. 328 The Hyde
Amendment allows a criminal defendant to recover attorney's fees in the
event she is acquitted, as long as she establishes that the government's
position was "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith." 329 Seeking to render
federal prosecutors accountable to ethical guidelines, the McDade Act
subjects them "to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules,
governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that
323 Id.

324 See Henning, supra note 285.

325 Id. at 47, citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-65 (1988);
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 185-88 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1,1-18 (1972).
326 Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.

§ 3006 A).
327 Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 801(a), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 530 B).

328 See 143 CONG. REc. H7791 (statement of Rep. Hyde).
329 Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006 A).
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attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other
330
attorneys in that State."
Unlike scholars who see these laws as promising starts in efforts to
curb or deter misconduct by federal prosecutors in grand jury investigations, 3 3 1 I do not harbor such sanguine expectations. Instead, I view this
approach as leaving the fortunes of those defendants and witnesses who
bear the brunt of the prosecutors' misconduct subject to the political
whims of the legislative branch. I wonder whether Congress would have
even considered the Hyde or McDade proposals if one of their members
had not, in their view, been the target of "overzealous and lawbreaking
officials in the United States Department of Justice. '3 32 Furthermore,
these laws impose daunting challenges to those defendants who may attempt to invoke them. The Hyde Amendment is the obverse side of the
Court's grand jury investigation jurisprudence; it requires the defendant
to prevail and to prove that the prosecution was vexatious or frivolous.
The McDade Act requires a suspect being investigated by a grand jury to
run the risk of a more vengeful prosecutor who will no doubt be angered
by having to contend with an ethical complaint.
Let us return to Bakaly's leak to The New York Times in which he
divulged to the press the possibility that the OIC might seek an indictment of Clinton. What sanctions were leveled at Bakaly? He "abruptly
resigned" from the OIC on March 11, 1999.333 Ultimately, Bakaly was
charged with criminal contempt and ordered to stand trial, presumably
for lying to the district court regarding his leaks to The New York Times
334
relating to the possible indictment of President Clinton.
This outcome contrasts with the fate of the IRS agents who flagrantly violated the criminal laws in the infamous "briefcase caper" case,
United States v. Payner.335 In that case, IRS agents deliberately induced
an illegal break-in of an apartment by violating the rights of a third party,
comfortable in the knowledge that their target would not be able to estab330 Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 801(a), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 530 B).
331 See HENNING, supra note 285, at 48-61. Although Professor Henning detects numerous flaws in both the Hyde and McDade Acts, he concludes that legislative redress is the best
means of addressing prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury investigations. For a thorough
critique of the McDade Act, see Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of
Federal Prosecutors,88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000).
332 Bill Moushey, Murtha Seeking ProsecutorLimits, Prrrs. POST-GAZETrrE, Feb. 3, 1999,

at Al (cited in HENNING, supra note 285, at 48 n.208). This was the statement attributed to
Representative Murtha in wake of Representative McDade's acquittal on bribery and RICO
charges.
333 John Broder, Starr'sEx-Spokesman Charged With Contempt in Case on Leaks, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2000, at Al.
334 Id.

335 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
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lish standing for Fourth Amendment purposes. 336 Just as in the grand
jury arena, the Supreme Court refused to invoke the supervisory powers
of the federal courts to sanction egregious behavior by government
337
agents.
Both the majority and the dissent in Payner concurred that the government had probably engaged in criminal behavior by breaking into the
apartment in order to gather evidence against its target. 338 Did the government agents responsible for committing these serious violations of the
law receive any meaningful sanctions? There is nothing in the record
indicating so. Indeed, the Payner majority sheepishly acknowledged in a
footnote that the IRS, in responding to these abuses, took measures "less
positive than one might expect from an agency charged with upholding
the law." 339 Similarly, Justice Marshall's dissent not only took the government to task for its failure to discipline the agents involved but also
alluded to the district court's finding that the government agents knew
they were violating the Constitution at the time they undertook their
340
abominable gambit.
We should be surprised, therefore, that Bakaly's contumacy was
punished. If the highest court in the land is willing to overlook serious
government violations because it does not wish to tread upon executive
prerogative, then it should shock us that Bakaly's leak to The New York
Times, and his deceptive answers to the district court, prompted such a
vehement response. Given the high stakes in the public drama regarding
the President's impeachment, the government would have seemed hypocritical in pursuing defendants for such acts but not members of its own
tribe, i.e., its own prosecutors and agents. Payner was an obscure citizen
familiar only to lawyers or scholars interested in the Court's criminal
justice opinions. But the President of the United States was a different
kind of defendant, with support from much of the American public and
an array of formidable counsel. One can then discern why the government agents in Payner escaped unscathed.
Oblivious or cynical to the message it has conveyed through the
abdication of its responsibility to uphold the values embedded in the
Constitution, the Supreme Court paved the way for the prosecutorial excesses that the American public recoiled at when Starr zealously pursued
336 Id. at 729-30.

337 See id. at 735.
338 Id. at 733 (describing the "possibly criminal behavior of those who planned and executed this 'briefcase caper'"). See also Justice Marshall's dissent, citing the District Court's
conclusion that "the actions of the IRS appeared to constitute a prima facie case of criminal
larceny under Florida law, and possibly violated other criminal laws of that State as well." Id.
at 746-47 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

339 Id. at 733 n.5.
340 Id. at 750-51 n.16.
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the impeachment of the President of the United States. Only legal technicians steeped in the Court's criminal justice doctrine could discern the
skepticism and contempt for the law the highest court in the nation has
bred. This cynicism is not limited to Independent Counsels. It extends
to prosecutors and law enforcement agents as well. Thus, elimination of
the Independent Counsel statute is not the panacea to a deep-seated and
pervasive disdain for the law born of Supreme Court opinions rooted in
theory rather. than practice.
CONCLUSION, PRESCRIPTIONS, AND POSTSCRIPT
At the outset of this endeavor, I sought to give a broader explanation for the constitutional crisis that embroiled the nation as a result of an
illicit affair between the President and a young, impressionable intern,
and the President's attempt to deny it. Although Ken Starr was Clinton's
foil in this surreal drama, I believe his role served to underscore an instrumental philosophy by a Court headed by a Chief Justice who has sent
a clear signal to law enforcement agents and prosecutors that securing a
conviction, even while circumventing the values and opinions supposedly undergirding the Constitution, is unseemly but palatable. I wish to
elaborate upon this assessment, and to briefly scrutinize recent Court
opinions which, taken at face value, may seem to undermine my conclusions. Finally, I wish to offer reasons for the Court's drift, which is
based not on doctrine or ideological fault lines but on lack of experience
in the "real world" of criminal law.
Let us first explore the erosion of privacy fostered by the Rehnquist
Court's narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Recently, Professor Jeffrey Rosen has exposed the manner in which the advent and
popularity of the Internet both at work and at home leaves Americans
without protection from their innermost thoughts, feelings, and communications. 34 1 My brief excursion into the Clinton-Lewinsky affair has
shown that the government can pry into our most private sanctuary, the
home, even without the benefit of the Internet or a search warrant. A
simple invitation of a "short-term, commercial" guest renders our homes
vulnerable to the government's "unwanted gaze." This holds true regardless of whether we live in an expensive home or an "ill-appointed"
apartment. "Big Brother" is here; ask President Clinton, and he will
painfully tell you. Most Americans are unaware that Starr was not the
culprit in our loss of privacy. Rather, Chief Justice Rehnquist-wearing
his majestic robe while supposedly presiding over President Clinton's
impeachment trial-and his Court bore the blame.
341 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA

(Random House ed., 2000).
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Critics might point to two opinions last term which seem to stem the
tide of government intrusion into our spheres of privacy. In Bond v.
United States, 3 4 2 the Court held that an officer's "physical manipulation"
of a passenger's baggage constituted a search that violated the Fourth
Amendment. 343 Similarly, the Court held in Floridav. J.L.344 that police
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a "stop and frisk" of an
individual based solely on an anonymous tip that the suspect was wearing a plaid shirt and carrying a gun. 345 I believe these two decisions are
consistent with the Rehnquist Court's motif to the extent that they can be
explained as attempts to protect property interests, the "old" talisman of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence before Katz; and to preserve a modicum of consistency in requiring at least a bare bones, yet partially corroborated, allegation before permitting a search and seizure in the streets.
Why is a "squeeze" of a passenger's soft luggage a search under the
Fourth Amendment while peering into the curtilage of a home from an
airplane 346 or a helicopter 347 is not? I believe the answer rests only in
part on the majority's analysis of whether the law enforcement action in
34 8
Bond was more "physically invasive" than mere "visual inspection.
Relying on the "search" rationale, the Bond majority obscures the more
obvious truth: what the law enforcement officer did by squeezing and
manipulating the luggage was to "seize" the property without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. By squeezing the luggage, the officer interfered with the owner's property interest by creating the risk that he might
349
damage property located inside the bag.
In fact, this conclusion is buttressed by Justice Breyer's dissenting
opinion in Bond, in which he was joined by Justice Scalia. 350 Denying
the distinction the majority relied upon, Justice Breyer instead emphasized the law enforcement agent's testimony that though his practice was
to "squeeze" the luggage "hard," it was not "hard enough to break something inside. '351 This is apparently where the two sides parted ways.
The majority believed the "squeeze" of the luggage by the police officer
carried the intolerable risk of interfering with the owner's property
rights; the dissent felt that the officer's testimony allayed that risk. Prop342 120 S.Ct. 1462 (2000).
343 Id.

at 1465.

344 120 S.Ct. 1375 (2000).
345 Id. at 1380.
346 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
347 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
348 Bond, 120 S.Ct. at 1464.
349 Id. at 1465. The opinion reminds me of Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Arizona v.
Hicks, in which the Court held that turning over a piece of stereo equipment in an apartment

constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
350 Bond, 120 S.Ct. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
351 Id.
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erty, not privacy, was the theme underlying the Bond opinion. After all,
would the Justices countenance an officer squeezing their luggage at the
risk of damaging a fine porcelain artifact? Though they travel by airplanes and not in buses, it may be that the possibility crossed the Justices' minds, even if subconsciously.
Turning to Floridav. J.L., I believe the Justices might have realized
that allowing the police to stop and frisk an individual in the streets on
the basis of an anonymous tip without any other indicia of criminal activity would effectively overrule whatever is left of Terry v. Ohio.352 The
only information available to the police was a description of the suspect
and the clothes he was wearing. When the police arrived at the site, they
saw no signs indicating criminal activity was "afoot." 353 Unlike Mr.
Wardlow, J.L had the fortune of not running at the sight of the police
when they encountered him on the street. By sheer luck, then, J.L-a
juvenile-escaped the fate an adult endured because he was either too
naive or too cocky to run from the police. Had J.L. scattered when the
police arrived at the scene, Wardlow might have portended a different
outcome for him.
More to the point, the Court left open the possibility that such a thin
veil might justify a search in different circumstances. For example, Justice Ginsburg hinted that the Court might be more sympathetic to the
government's position if the tip involved a person carrying a bomb; or
was present in settings where "reasonable" expectations of privacy are
"diminished," such as schools or airports. 354 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in
a concurring opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, suggested that an anonymous tip, without other corroborating indicia of criminality, might satisfy the Terry standard if it can be traced to a specific telephone number
'355
or a person who related the information to an officer "face-to-face.
In sum, neither Bond nor J.L. reflect the Rehnquist Court's reversal
of its decimation of Katz, the privacy "lodestar." Carter, Wardlow, and
Houghton are emblematic and more representative: they constitute a pattern designed to leave Warren Court precedents in place while undermining their doctrinal bases. In the process, such a philosophy fosters an
ethos among law enforcement agencies and prosecutors that Supreme
Court opinions are meant to be observed and, at the same time,
circumvented.
352 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing a
reasonable suspicion that he is involved in imminent
dangerous).
353 Florida v. J.L., 120 S.Ct. at 1377. The majority
tered J.L. they "did not see a firearm, and J.L. made
movements." Id.
354 Id. at 1380 (citations omitted).
355 Id. at 1381 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

stop and frisk of an individual upon
criminal activity and is armed and
noted that when the officers encounno threatening or otherwise unusual
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How does one explain the most recent opinion, authored by none
other than Justice Scalia, in Kyllo v. United States?356 In Kyllo, the
Court held that use by the police of a thermal imaging device positioned
in public streets to detect relative amounts of heat emanating from a
home constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 357 The decision is strange for two reasons: first, Justice Scalia relies on Katz, a decision he detests and has criticized; and second, Justice Stevens, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, writes the dissent.
Justice Scalia's rationale is rooted in the dangers to the Katz "expectation
of privacy" safeguards inherent in information retrievable through
"sense-enhancing technology. '3 58 He qualifies the breadth of the holding, however, by limiting it to technology that "is not in general public
use."3 59
Strange as Kyllo may appear, it does not affect my analysis of the
collateral consequences flowing from Carter. Law enforcement agents
are free to employ sense-enhancing technology and to introduce the fruits
of such "searches" against short-term commercial guests of a house, who
will lack standing to contest the search or its fruits. It is ironic that after
his attack upon Katz in Carter, Justice Scalia finds, with respect to
homes, that Katz has "roots deep in the common law."' 360 In the space of
a term, Katz is transformed from a "fuzzy" opinion to one that, at least
with respect to homes, has historical and constitutional validity. A stranger to our jurisprudence would find Justice Scalia's sudden about-face
puzzling. Kyllo reflects the Court's institutional schizophrenia in the
criminal justice arena, a schizophrenia that undermines the legitimacy of
its handiwork.
That brings us to the most noted opinion by the Court this past term,
Dickerson v. United States.3 61 Confounding the pundits, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion upholding the constitutionality of
the Miranda doctrine. Is Chief Justice Rehnquist reversing course?
Quite the contrary, he probably learned the obvious: as I have argued, 362
the Chief Justice might have realized that the constricted version of Miranda is, on balance, a boon rather than a burden to the police. Only
those who live in a "fairyland" of imagined lost confessions, rather than
in real police precincts, would believe a lot of confessions in important
cases are lost because the Miranda warnings were not administered. I
find it amusing that forgotten in the Dickerson controversy is the fact that
356 Kyllo v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (2001).
357 Id. at 2046.
358 Id. at 2043.
359 Id.
360 Id.

361 Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000).
362 See Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, supra note 87.
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the motion to suppress the most damning evidence against him on Fourth
Amendment grounds was denied. 363 On the other hand, the suppression
of Dickerson's confession will not impede his prosecution or prevent his
conviction.
We have seen that the impeachment and concomitant violation of
the President and Lewinsky's privacy, the coercive tactics employed by
the OIC to persuade Lewinsky to confess and turn government agent, and
the potential transgression of grand jury rules, were all rendered legal
principally through Rehnquist Court precedents. Starr and his subordinates did what the law permitted them to get away with, however repugnant it may have looked to a significant portion of the American people.
This is a function of an ethically bankrupt criminal justice jurisprudence
in which the Rehnquist Court, while seemingly upholding (though chipping away at) the center of Warren Court doctrine, simultaneously invites law enforcement to flout the spirit and heart of these precedents.
Indeed, the Court would stand on higher ground if it discarded this charade and returned to the pre-Warren era. Maybe at that point the players
below would respect the law of the land rather than view it as a superable
obstacle or, as one commentator has aptly observed, as useful sta364
tionhouse furniture.
Is this direction the Court has taken attributable to ideology? I believe it is attributable to something more fundamental: naivete about
what happens in the "real world" of criminal law. None of the members
of the current court have any experience in the field; there are no former
prosecutors or defense attorneys in the Court. I find it perplexing that
Judge Posner castigates the current Court's apparentfaux pas in allowing
a sitting President to be sued and ascribes the error to its political naivete. 365 He describes the Rehnquist Court as "notable for its high professional sheen-and lack of political experience. ' 366 By that measure,
Judge Posner is equally unfit to judge criminal cases. He has no experience in the field of criminal law, much like the current members of the
Court and even Starr, for that matter. The ultimate pragmatist should not
criticize when he himself lacks the experience to make decisions in criminal law grounded in reality rather than in ethereal casuistry.
Gradually eviscerating Warren Court doctrine, the Rehnquist Court
has wrought the ultimate quagmire it confronted in the Dickerson case:
upholding precedent it has decimated. Perhaps if the Court had consisted
363 United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 693-95 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd Dickerson v.
United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000).
364 See SIMON, supra note 250, at 211. Simon refers to the Miranda doctrine. I believe,
however, that his point is applicable to the Court's Fourth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
as well.
365 POSNER, supra note 15, at 229.
366 Id.
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of some criminal law practitioners, it would have evaded the tortured
path Miranda, and the rest of its criminal justice doctrine, has followed.
In the process, the Court would have recognized the real world implications of an area that touches the deepest recesses of our society at its
most real level: crime in the streets, in the corporate world, and, yes,
however bizarrely, in the Office of the President of the United States.
Our next President ought to consider the broad implications of the
Clinton impeachment saga. In selecting Supreme Court justices, he
should consider the individual's insight into the real world of criminal
law. As The New York Times noted in a past editorial, the most glaring
shortcoming of the Rehnquist Court "is its myopia about real situations
in the real world. This Court too often deals in abstract ideology with no
appreciation of how people will actually behave under the force of its
rulings." 367 This prescription rings true in the criminal arena more than

in any other field of constitutional jurisprudence. It is even more resonant today than it was in 1993, when the editorial was written. The
Court must come down from its pedestal and broaden its horizon with
members who will understand the consequences their opinions will
wreak in the streets, corporate offices and, for that matter, the Internet.
The Clinton constitutional crisis emerged not from a "politically naive"
Supreme Court; it was born of ignorance of the ramifications of criminal
constitutional jurisprudence in the most "real" of worlds. Take heed Mr.
President: it is not ideology that counts stupid; it is experience in the real
world of criminal law that matters. Follow this advice from a quixotic
law professor who practiced criminal law on the streets of Miami, Florida during the 1980s at the risk of your political peril.

367 Editorial, A Court For Real People, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 1993, at Al.

